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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is a case study of the impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the 
Louisiana court system and the response of the court system to the aftermath of these two 
hurricanes.  Although this thesis focuses on one state’s court system’s response to two 
natural disasters, the research, conclusions and recommendations are transferable to other 
states. 
 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the Gulf Coast in 2005 devastating large areas 
in Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi and Alabama.  Millions of people, including judges and 
attorneys, were forced to evacuate their homes, courts and law offices.  The Hurricanes 
caused interruptions to both federal and state courts in Louisiana. 
 Existing literature, both published and unpublished, was reviewed to determine 
how courts have responded to natural and man-made disasters in the past.  Interviews 
with court personnel in Louisiana were conducted and available publications were 
reviewed to determine how courts in Louisiana were impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita and how these courts responded to the aftermath of these two hurricanes. 
 The broad geographic scope of the damage from the hurricanes created 
impediments to rapid resumption of court operations; however courts in Louisiana were 
able to resume most operations within a matter of months.  Since Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita, both federal and state courts in Louisiana have refined their emergency 
preparedness plans; however, further improvements are warranted. 
This thesis examines the impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the Louisiana 
court system and concludes with several recommendations for future emergency 
preparedness of the courts including implementation of electronic filing and record 
viii 
management systems, passage of legislation providing for extra-territorial exercise of 
jurisdiction in civil proceedings and additional training for stakeholders to better prepare 
for emergency conditions. 
 
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
During late August and early September 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
devastated vast regions of the Gulf South. Although Hurricane Katrina’s effects garnered 
far more media attention due to levee breaches, extensive flooding and resulting 
subsequent adverse impacts on the city of New Orleans, Hurricane Rita also dealt a 
severe blow to the citizens and infrastructure of southwest Louisiana.  
The aftermath of both of these storms has been well documented in numerous 
books, manuscripts and government reports.1 Clearly, these storms had a significant 
impact not only on those most directly impacted such as the citizens of Louisiana, but 
also on the nation as a whole.  This impact was both financial as well as psychological. 
The hurricanes of 2005 made the nation realize that even four years after the tragic events 
of September 11, 2001, neither the state nor federal governments were ready to 
effectively respond to a large scale disaster. 
The judicial system in Louisiana was among the numerous institutions impacted 
by the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This thesis examines the impact of 
Hurricane’s Katrina and Rita on the Louisiana judicial system and how the courts, both 
state and federal, responded following these two natural disasters. Since a variety of large 
                                                 
1
 See e.g., Douglas Brinkley, The Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and The Mississippi Gulf 
Coast, Harper Collins Publishers New York, New York (2006); Ivor van Heerden and Mike Bryan, The 
Storm: What Went Wrong and Why During Hurricane Katrina—the Inside Story from One Louisiana 
Scientist, Viking Penguin, New York, New York (2006);  John McQuaid and Mark Schleifstein, Path of 
Destruction: The Devastation of New Orleans and the Coming Age of Superstorms, Little Brown and 
Company, New York, New York (2006); Christopher Cooper and Robert Block, Disaster: Hurricane 
Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security, Henry Holt and Company, New York, New York (2006); 
Unnatural Disaster The Nation on Hurricane Katrina, Betsy Reed editor, Nation Books, New York, New 
York (2006); The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (2006) 
available at http://www.library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/katrinawh.pdf;  “A Failure of Initiative” Final 
Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina, Report No. 109-377, U.S. Government Printing Office (2006). 
2 
scale disasters have occurred in the past and will surely occur in the future, it is important 
to examine this topic.2   
Disaster brings with it chaos. Chaos frequently brings not only conflict but an 
opportunity for those in power to abuse it.  It is beneficial to society, in order to build 
sustainability, that legal rights be protected and conflicts resolved in an expedient fashion 
following a large scale disaster. Resolution of conflict and protection of individual rights 
fosters stability, which in turn facilitates recovery within the impacted communities.  In 
many natural disasters, the effects are disproportionately harsh on the poor, infirm and 
weak including minorities.3  Particular attention to quickly re-establishing an effective 
judicial system is warranted in order to protect the rights of those who, in many cases, 
cannot protect themselves. 
In our nation, the court system is utilized to resolve conflicts and protect 
individual rights in a peaceful manner.  In order for the courts to perform their mandated 
constitutional and statutory function to uphold and apply the rule of law, it is critical that 
courts themselves be prepared to resume operations and functions as expediently as 
possible following large scale disasters. This response is not limited to merely opening 
                                                 
2
 See, Thomas Birkland, Disasters and the Court’s Agenda, 37 The Judges Journal 6 (Fall 1998); Keith O. 
Boyum, Understanding Disasters and Other Impacts on Courts, 37 The Judges Journal 12 (Fall 1998); 
Theodore B. Pedeliski, A Case of Judicial Restoration: A Court System Responds to and Recovers from The 
Red River Flood of 1997, 37 The Judges Journal 17 (Fall 1998); Rebecca Mae Salokar, After the Winds: 
Hurricane Andrew’s Impact on  Judicial Institutions in South Florida, 37 Judges Journal 26 (Fall 1998); 
Stephen L. Wasby, Disruption, Dislocation,  Discretion and Dependence: The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals and the Loma Prieta Earthquake, 37 The Judges Journal 33 (Fall 1998). 
3
 See, William P. Quigley, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Katrina: Human and Civil Rights Left Behind 
Again, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 955 (2007); Sarah S. Vance, Justice after Disaster—What Hurricane Katrina Did to 
the Justice System in New Orleans, 51 How. L. J. 621 (2007-2008); Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, 
Criminal Justice Collapse: The Constitution After Hurricane Katrina, 56 Duke L.J. 127 (2006); William P. 
Quigley, Six Months After Katrina: Who Was Left Behind, Then and Now, CommonDreams.org, Feb. 21, 
2006, http://commondreams.org/views06/0221-36.htm.  
3 
the courthouse doors.4  The courts must also be prepared to resolve, in an efficient 
manner, the potential deluge of lawsuits that will surely follow a widespread disaster.  
 Like any system, the judicial system is comprised of component parts. While 
typically thought of as a single institution, the judicial system is a system comprised of 
human beings. The component parts of the judicial system include the courts themselves 
(judges and court personnel), as well as participant “stakeholders” such as attorneys, 
“justice” partners such as police officers, sheriffs and their deputies and even members of 
the public who serve the judicial system as jurors in civil and criminal cases. Although 
this thesis focuses primarily on the courts, where applicable, a brief discussion of the 
stakeholders in the judicial system will also be included.  Although the courts may be 
operational, if the key stakeholders such as law enforcement personnel, attorneys, 
litigants and members of the public who serve as jurors cannot perform their respective 
roles, the judicial system cannot function properly or effectively.  
 Although the court system includes both a criminal and civil function, the 
primary focus of this thesis is on the civil function of the courts.  Many media accounts 
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita discussed the impact of the hurricanes on the 
justice system. However, most of these accounts focused on the impact of the flooding on 
the Orleans Parish Criminal Court. It is worthy to make several observations. This 
particular court was located in a vulnerable area and was inundated with floodwaters.  
The flooding certainly played a role in the Orleans Parish Criminal Court’s slow recovery 
from the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. However, there were pre-existing systemic 
                                                 
4
 See, Diane P. Wood, The Bedrock of Individual Rights in Times of Natural Disasters, 51 How. L. J. 747 
(2007-2008)(arguing that in order for the rule of law to prevail following a disaster, the procedural vehicles 
for administering the rule of law, i.e. the courts, must be available to the citizens) and American Bar 
Association, Rule of Law in Times of Major Disaster (2007). 
4 
problems with the criminal justice system in New Orleans that also played a role in the 
delayed recovery of this component of the judicial system following the hurricanes. 
Others have identified and discussed many of the pre-existing conditions that 
independently contributed to the adverse impact on the criminal court in Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana.5  Other significant issues related to a break down of the criminal court system 
in New Orleans, such as deprivation of constitutional protections to speedy trials, right to 
counsel, right to trial by jury, the care and housing of prisoners, a continued funding and 
personnel crisis, missing criminal evidence and inability to locate witnesses for the 
prosecution, also have been addressed by others and are not the focus of this thesis.6  It is 
worth noting, however that many of the concerns about Hurricane Katrina’s impact on 
the criminal justice system were subsequently addressed by the Louisiana Legislature.7 
In the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the response to and preparation for 
large scale disasters was examined at the highest levels of the federal government. 
                                                 
5
 See e.g., William P. Quigley, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Katrina, Human and Civil Rights Left Behind 
Again, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 955 (2007); Brandon L. Garrett and Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice Collapse: The 
Constitution After Hurricane Katrina; 56 Duke L. J. 127 (2006); Ira P. Robbins, Lessons from Hurricane 
Katrina: Prison Emergency Preparedness as a Constitutional Imperative, 42 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 1 
(2008); Pamela R. Metzger, Doing Katrina Time, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 1175 (2007); American Civil Liberties 
Union National Prison Project, Abandoned and Abused: Orleans Parish Prisoners in the Wake of Hurricane 
Katrina 13 (Aug. 2006), http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/prison/oppreport20060809.pdf; Sarah S. Vance, Justice 
After Disaster—What Hurricane Katrina Did to the Justice System in New Orleans, 51 How. L.J. 621 
(2007-2008).  
6
 See e.g., William P. Quigley, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Katrina: Human and Civil Rights Left Behind 
Again, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 955 (2007); Pamela R. Metzger, Doing Katrina Time, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 1175 (2007); 
American Civil Liberties Union National Prison Project, Abandoned and Abused: Orleans Parish Prisoners 
in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina 13 (Aug. 2006), http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/prison/oppreport20060809.pdf; 
Sarah S. Vance, Justice After Disaster—What Hurricane Katrina Did to the Justice System in New Orleans, 
51 How. L.J. 621 (2007-2008); Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice Collapse: The 
Constitution After Hurricane Katrina, 56 Duke L. J. 127 (2006); Vera Inst. of Justice, Proposals for New 
Orleans’ Criminal Justice System: Best Practices to Advance Public Safety and Justice (2007), available at 
http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/399_770.pdf; Bureau of Justice Assistance, Dep’t of Justice, An 
Assessment of the Immediate and Longer Term Needs of the New Orleans Public Defender System, 8 
(April 2006) available at http://www.lajusticecoalition.org/doc/DOJ-Orleans-Parish-Study.pdf;  State v. 
Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325 (La. 2005) (finding that a court can halt proceedings until adequate source of 
funding for indigent defendant’s defense is found). 
7
 See e.g. 2005 1st Ex. Session Act 52 (enacting provisions of Louisiana Criminal Code to insure operation 
of the criminal justice system during times of emergency). 
5 
Numerous hearings were held by members of the U.S. House of Representatives and the 
U.S. Senate. The Speaker of the House of Representatives even appointed a Select 
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina (“Select Committee”).8 After an investigation lasting several months, the Select 
Committee ultimately issued a report titled, “A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the 
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina.”9 
Individuals in multiple disciplines ranging from structural engineering and coastal 
processes to emergency preparedness testified before the U.S. Congressional committees 
investigating Hurricane Katrina.  The individuals testifying also included high ranking 
state and federal governmental officials including the Governors of Louisiana and 
Mississippi, The Lieutenant Governor of Louisiana, the Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security and the former head of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency.10  Representative individuals who were stranded in New Orleans in the 
aftermath of the storm were also afforded an opportunity to tell their story to members of 
Congress during the congressional hearings. Hundreds of thousands of pages of 
documentary evidence were also reviewed in conjunction with the congressional 
investigations. 
In addition to congressional investigations, the White House conducted its own 
investigation into the preparation for, and response to, Hurricane Katrina. The White 
                                                 
8
 A partial listing of the Congressional hearings on Hurricane Katrina is included in Appendix “A.” 
9
 See, “A Failure of Initiative” Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Report No. 109-377, U.S. Government Printing Office 
(2006). 
10
 A partial listing of the individuals testifying before Congressional Committees is included in Appendix 
“B.” 
6 
House subsequently released its own report in February, 2006 titled “The Federal 
Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned.”11  
The congressional hearings, the Select Committee report, as well as the White 
House’s report, primarily focused on the federal and state governments’ response to 
Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath.  Despite the generous input from the individuals who 
testified before Congress and who cooperated with White House investigators, very little 
in these reports addresses the preparation and response of the judicial branch of 
government.12 
The judicial system, inclusive of all of its component parts (the courts and their 
support components such as the clerks of court, attorneys, and other justice partners such 
as sheriffs and their deputies) was clearly impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  
However, very little has been written in the academic community concerning the judicial 
system’s preparation for, and response to, these storms.  
Overall, Louisiana’s judicial system responded quite well to the aftermath of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  The federal judiciary’s response was better than the state’s; 
however, given the circumstances, both systems ultimately responded to the crisis and 
resumed operations in a relatively short period of time.   
The author submits that one reason that the judicial branch appears to have 
responded better than other branches is that the judicial system has been impacted by 
natural and man-made disasters in the past. Lessons from past disasters have not only 
been learned over the years, but the members of the judiciary and other stakeholders have 
                                                 
11
 The White House, “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned.” 
12
 Two paragraphs in the White House report note that Hurricane Katrina forced the temporary closure of 
courts in the New Orleans area.  The White House, “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned,” pp. 41 and 58. 
7 
discussed these lessons and attempted to make preparations for future disasters. However, 
there is always room for improvement. Despite the judicial systems’ successful recovery 
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, additional steps can be taken to better prepare for 
the future.  This thesis concludes by making several recommendations for future action 
which, if implemented, may better prepare the judicial system to response to disasters in 
the future.  These recommendations include a recommendation that courts in vulnerable 
areas consider implementing electronic filing and records management systems to protect 
vital court records and facilitate operations from remote locations, that the Louisiana 
Legislature consider passing legislation expressly authorizing courts to conduct extra-
jurisdictional civil proceedings during times of emergency and that attorneys, a vital 
component of the judicial system, periodically receive continuing education on the topic 
of disaster planning and continuity of operations planning to better prepare for operations 
following disasters. 
Although this thesis focuses on the judicial system in Louisiana following two 
hurricanes, the lessons learned are transferable and can benefit the judiciary in all states 
to better prepare for a variety of future disasters, both natural and man-made. 
In order to place discussion of Hurricane Katrina and Rita’s impact on the 
Louisiana judicial system in context, an overview of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and an 
overview of Louisiana’s judicial system will first be provided. 
8 
A. Overview of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita13 
 The story of Hurricane Katrina begins on August 24, 2005 when Tropical 
Depression 12 strengthened into Tropical Storm Katrina in the Caribbean Sea.14  The 
National Weather Service promptly issued a hurricane warning for the southeastern 
Florida coast. The following day, August 25, 2005, Hurricane Katrina stuck Florida’s 
southeastern coast as a Category 1 hurricane between Hallandale Beach and North Miami 
Beach.15 On August 26, 2005, Katrina weakened over land into a tropical storm before 
entering the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico.16  In its brief traversal of Florida, 
Katrina dealt a heavy toll—more than a dozen deaths.17   
On August 26, 2006, President George W. Bush declared an impending disaster 
along the Gulf Coast and ordered the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the 
Department of  Homeland Security to prepare for a second landfall along the Gulf Coast.  
At approximately 11:00 p.m. on August 26, 2005, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco 
declared a state of emergency in Louisiana.18 
                                                 
13
 The timeline that follows was compiled from a number of sources including reports of testimony before 
various committees of the Congress.  Information from various websites was also utilized including: 
“Hurricane Katrina Timeline” by CBC News compiled on September 4, 2005 available at 
www.cbc.ca/news/background/katrina/katrina_timeline.html (last visited March 17, 2010); Hurricane 
Katrina Timeline, The Brookings Institute, www.brookings.edu; Hurricane Rita Timeline: Dallas Star-
Telegram.com www.dfw.com/mld/startelegram/news/state/12744426.htm?templet; The Federal Response 
to Hurricane Katrina: The White House, Lessons Learned; and Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and 
Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, August 23-30, 2005, prepared for the National 
Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 2005). 
14
 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned p. 22 (February 2005); Richard D. Knabb, 
Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, August 23-30, 2005, 
prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, 
Florida, December 2005). 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned p. 23. 
18
 State of Louisiana, Executive Department, Proclamation No.48 KBB 2005: State of Emergency-
Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge, August 26, 2005). 
9 
The initial belief was that Katrina would make secondary landfall along the 
central or western Florida panhandle.  However, during the evening of August 26 and 
early morning hours of August 27, strong steering currents and the warm Gulf Stream 
Loop in the Gulf of Mexico caused the storm to move further to the west.19 Forecasters 
predicted that a secondary landfall along the Louisiana/Mississippi coast would occur 
within the next forty-eight to fifty-six hours.20   
By this time, Hurricane Katrina had grown to a Category 2 hurricane and was 
forecasted to strengthen into a major hurricane within the next twenty-four hours.21   
On Saturday, August 27, 2005, Katrina strengthened to a Category 3 hurricane 
and a strike in the vicinity of New Orleans/Biloxi/Gulfport was becoming more certain.22  
Hurricane watches and warnings were issued for Louisiana’s southeastern coast, 
including New Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain.23 At approximately 5:00 p.m., New 
Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin declared a state of emergency and urged residents in low-lying 
areas to voluntarily evacuate.24 By 6:00 p.m. the National Weather Service estimated that 
there was a 45% chance that Katrina would directly hit New Orleans as a Category 4 or 5 
                                                 
19
 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 
August 23-30, 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (Miami, Florida, December 2005). 
20
 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 
August 23-30, 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (Miami, Florida, December 2005); U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory No. 11 (Washington 
D.C., August 26, 2005); The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned p. 23-24. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 
August 23-30, 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (Miami, Florida, December 2005); U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory No. 15A 
(Washington D.C., August 27, 2005). 
24
 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned p. 26; City of New Orleans, “Mayor Nagin 
Urges Citizens to Prepare for Hurricane Katrina,” News Release, August 27, 2005. 
10 
Hurricane. President Bush signed a Federal emergency declaration for the State of 
Louisiana in response to Governor Blanco’s earlier request.25 
By early morning on Sunday, August 28, 2005, Hurricane Katrina had grown into 
a strong Category 5 storm.26  A direct strike on New Orleans appeared more certain.  At 
8:00 a.m., the Louisiana Superdome was opened as a shelter.27 At approximately 11:00 
a.m., Mayor Nagin appeared on television telling the public that, “[o]ur worst fears are 
realized,” and that there was a strong probability that the storm would strike New Orleans 
within the next twenty-four hours.  He also warned that there was concern that the levees 
would not fully protect the city.  Mayor Nagin therefore ordered a mandatory evacuation 
for New Orleans (President Bush had previously suggested a mandatory evacuation of 
New Orleans before Mayor Nagin made this public statement).28  By 3:00 p.m. on 
Sunday afternoon, the Superdome population had grown to 10,000 people with others 
waiting outside.29 
It was later revealed in hearings before the Senate Commerce, Science and 
Transportation Committee; Disaster Prevention and Prediction Subcommittee hearing on 
September 20, 2005, and in the House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina on 
September 22, 2005, that Dr. Max Mayfield, Director of the National Hurricane Center in 
Florida had, since August 24, 2005, held regular briefings with FEMA and other state and 
                                                 
25
 Louisiana Emergency and Related Determinations, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,238 (August 27, 2005). 
26
 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 
August 23-30, 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (Miami, Florida, December 2005); Select Bipartisan Committee on Hurricane Katrina 
(Testimony of General David Johnson, Director, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
National Weather Service), 109th Congress, First Session, September 22, 2005. 
27
 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned p. 29. 
28
 Select Bi-Partisan Committee on Hurricane Katrina (Testimony of Mayor Ray Nagin), 109th Congress, 
First Session, December 14, 2005,. 
29
 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned p. 29; Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs (Written Statement of Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director for 
External Affairs, Region One, FEMA), 109th Congress, First Session, October 20, 2005. 
11 
federal emergency agencies at noon each day.  President Bush participated in at least one 
of these conferences by telephone from his ranch in Crawford, Texas.30  On the evening 
of Saturday August 27, Mayfield personally called the governors of Alabama, Mississippi 
and Louisiana, as well as Mayor Nagin, to make sure that they understood the threat.  
Mayfield testified that, “[p]oliticians can be very isolated. I told them that I wanted to go 
to bed that night knowing I had done everything I could do.”  Mayfield also testified that 
he did not make any recommendations with respect to evacuations, since such decisions 
were not within the authority of the National Weather Service.31  
The National Weather Service did, however, begin issuing statements late on 
Sunday, August 28, 2005, which made the situation perfectly clear.  These statements 
declared that Katrina would be “potentially catastrophic” and “extremely dangerous” and 
that once the storm hits New Orleans, “most of the area will be uninhabitable for 
weeks…perhaps longer.”32 
On Monday, August 29, 2005, at approximately 6:10 a.m., Hurricane Katrina 
made landfall near Buras, Louisiana as a strong Category 3 hurricane.33  Over the course 
of the next four hours, Katrina’s winds and storm surge pummeled southeast Louisiana. 
At 8:14 a.m. the National Weather Service issued a flood warning due to a levee breach 
                                                 
30
 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned p. 22-28; Senate Commerce, Science and 
Transportation Committee, Disaster Prevention and Prediction Subcommittee hearing on “The Lifesaving 
Role of Accurate Hurricane Prediction,” (Testimony of Dr. Max Mayfield), 109th Congress, First Session, 
September 20, 2005 and House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina hearing on “Predicting Hurricanes: 
What We Knew About Katrina and When,” (Testimony of Dr. Max Mayfield), 109th Congress, First 
Session, September 22, 2005. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather 
Service, New Orleans/Baton Rouge Forecast Office, Slidell, Louisiana, “Urgent Weather Message,” 
August 28, 2005. 
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along the Industrial Canal in New Orleans’ Ninth Ward and Arabie area.34  The National 
Weather Service warning estimated 3 to 8 feet of flooding in the area.35   
The storm progressed throughout the morning making a secondary landfall at 
approximately 10:00 a.m. near the Louisiana/Mississippi border.36  At this time, Katrina 
was reported to be a Category 3 storm with sustained winds of 125 miles per hour.37  
Winds and storm surge (estimated between 20-30 feet) damaged a 125 mile wide stretch 
of the Gulf Coast between Louisiana and Alabama.38  Major population centers in Pass 
Christian, Biloxi and Gulfport, Mississippi were, in large part, destroyed.39  Mobile Bay, 
impacted by an estimated 20 foot storm surge, caused flooding in the city of Mobile and 
along the eastern shore of Mobile Bay in and around Pointe Clear, Alabama.40 
By 2:00 p.m., New Orleans officials confirmed that there had been a breach at the 
17th Street Canal and that approximately 20% of the city has flooded. At approximately 
1:45 p.m. President Bush declared Louisiana and Mississippi national disaster areas.   
In the afternoon hours, after the worst of the storm had passed New Orleans, it 
became evident that the Superdome and other infrastructure including oil refineries, 
roads, and bridges were damaged or closed.  Access to New Orleans via Interstate 10 
traveling west was impossible due to the collapse of the twin span bridges across Lake 
Pontchartrain.  In the late afternoon as weather conditions in New Orleans improved, the 
Coast Guard began rescue missions. Over 1200 persons were plucked from flooded areas 
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of the city within the first hours of rescue operations. Rear Admiral Robert Duncan, 
Commander of the Eighth Coast Guard District, would later tell the U.S. Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee that despite their own personal 
losses of 579 homes, Coast Guard personnel successfully rescued 33,544 people stranded 
during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.41  The Coast Guard’s performance was later 
lauded as one of the success stories of the response to Hurricane Katrina.42 
By the evening of Tuesday, August 30, the situation in New Orleans, initially 
thought to have not been bad, became a catastrophic nightmare. Additional levees failed 
including the levees at the Industrial Canal, London Street Canal and the 17th Street 
Canal. Over 80% of the City of New Orleans was soon under water with floods reaching 
as high as 20 feet in some areas.43 An estimated 50,000 to 100,000 residents who had not 
evacuated the city were stranded in the attics or on the roofs of their homes, at the 
Louisiana Superdome and at the New Orleans Convention Center. Interestingly, 
according to the Brookings Institute Timeline, although the New Orleans Convention 
Center had been discussed as a possible shelter by New Orleans officials, it was never 
officially chosen as a place of refuge and was not listed in the New Orleans 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan as a shelter.44 
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During the day on Tuesday, August 30, mixed messages were being sent to first 
responders.  According to the Brookings Institute, FEMA stopped volunteer firefighters 
with special rescue expertise from entering the city of New Orleans due to security 
issues, urging them to wait for the National Guard. State officials were calling for anyone 
with boats to help with the rescue.45  By 6:30 p.m., it was evident that the floodwaters 
were continuing to rise and that the few pumps that were in operation would soon fail.  
By nightfall, looting begin to spread throughout the city.  At the same time the Corps of 
Engineers was working (unsuccessfully) to fill the breach at the 17th Street Canal.46   
In the days that followed, the situation in New Orleans grew worse.  Early on 
August 31, 2005, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin issued a grim estimate of the potential 
death toll in New Orleans stating that the fatalities may reach into the thousands. 
Throughout the day on August 31, 2005, looting in New Orleans increased dramatically.  
As Governor Blanco asked the White House to send more help, New Orleans Police and 
available national guardsmen were called off search and rescue missions to combat the 
looting.  
At this time an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 people were at the Superdome where 
conditions were growing worse by the hour.  There were no working toilets, no air-
conditioning and insufficient food and water at the massive facility.  Rumors of deaths 
and rapes at the Superdome also began to spread.47     
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The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ preliminary estimate was that it would take a 
minimum of thirty days to dewater the city of New Orleans.  Gasoline prices began to 
surge to almost $3 per gallon and there were severe shortages, exacerbated by a massive 
loss of electrical power in the region and the loss of several refineries and crude oil 
transportation systems.   
In Washington, the Pentagon commenced one of the largest search and rescue 
missions in history, deploying military aircraft and naval vessels to New Orleans.  
Despite the fact that significant help was still days away from New Orleans, Homeland 
Defense Secretary Michael Chertoff declared that his department was pleased with the 
response. Meanwhile in New Orleans, some city police had abandoned their search 
efforts in an attempt to control growing violence and others were simply walking off the 
job, driving their patrol cars out of the city.48 
On September 1, 2005, civil unrest continued to spread throughout New Orleans 
with looting, carjacking and other violence increasing.  Rumors of rapes, marauding 
armed gangs and murder spread.  The military revised plans and began deploying up to 
30,000 troops to New Orleans (this deployment was later increased to 40,000 as members 
of the National Guard were supplemented with regular military personnel from Army, 
Navy, Marines and Coast Guard). Outside the New Orleans Convention Center, an 
estimated crowd of 25,000 waited in the sweltering heat for buses that failed to come.  
Images of invalids dying in wheel chairs and hungry and thirsty children were transmitted 
throughout the world by the national and international media.  Although rescue and relief 
had apparently been unable to access New Orleans, ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN and BBC 
reporters were on site.  Incredibly, in a radio interview the same day, Secretary Chertoff 
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dismissed reports of the thousands at the Convention Center.  Later in the evening on 
September 1 on the Paula Zahn show, FEMA Director Brown said that the federal 
government only learned about the Convention Center that day. Hours later on Nightline, 
Brown was grilled by Ted Koppel about the Convention Center.  Brown repeated his 
earlier statements that the government only found out about the convention center that 
day. Koppel would sharply respond, “Don’t you guys watch the television?”49  
Also on September 1, as state officials were preventing the Red Cross from 
entering the city of New Orleans with food and water, doctors at New Orleans hospitals, 
text messaged colleagues and broadcast to the media that they were still at local hospitals 
desperately in need of help. These messages were saying that food, water and emergency 
power were almost gone and that greater numbers of people would soon die unless 
immediate help arrived.   
In the late afternoon, frustration and anger reached a peak during WWL Radio 
host Garland Robinette’s live interview of Mayor Nagin. The Mayor pulled no punches 
stating that conditions in New Orleans were dire and that federal and state officials 
needed to “stop the goddamned press conferences” and “get off their asses”.50 
On the morning of September 2, President Bush left the White House to travel to 
Louisiana.  In apparent response to negative publicity and growing criticism of the 
federal response to the crisis on the Gulf Coast, the President acknowledged on the White 
House lawn that, “the results [of the relief effort] are not acceptable.”51  The President 
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then flew first to Alabama then Biloxi, Mississippi, where he called the damage “worse 
than imaginable.”  In Biloxi, the President clarified his earlier statement regarding the 
federal response by stating that he was “satisfied with the response…not the results.”     
By mid-morning on September 2, 2005, thousands of national guardsmen begin to 
arrive in New Orleans with supplies and needed reinforcements to quell the civil unrest.  
In a scene reminiscent of the Academy Award winning movie Patton, Lt. General Russell 
Honore was shown on the television newscasts directing military vehicle traffic and 
shouting instructions to troops outside the Superdome.  The image of a cigar chomping 
three-star general in control on the streets of New Orleans was somewhat reassuring to 
the public.  Throughout the day on September 2, the situation in New Orleans began to 
improve.  In the afternoon, President Bush arrived in New Orleans to survey the damage 
and to meet with Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin. Aboard Air Force One, the 
President proposed to Governor Blanco that she request that the local police and National 
Guard be put under federal control to establish a more firm chain of command and to 
have better coordination in operations.52  Governor Blanco reportedly told the President 
that she had to think about the proposal.53   By this time, individuals with different 
political agenda begin to jockey for position in light of the situation in New Orleans. On 
September 3, Governor Blanco decided that she would not relinquish control of state and 
local forces to the federal government.54  Despite this decision, an immense federal 
presence descended upon New Orleans over the next few days and an alphabet soup of 
federal agencies, authorized to carry weapons, was present in the Crescent City.  New 
Orleans began to be depopulated and the city became more secure as search and rescue 
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efforts were transformed into recovery missions. Temporary disaster mortuaries were 
established with the central facility being housed in a vacant warehouse in St. Gabriel, 
Louisiana.   
By Sunday, September 4, the Superdome had been fully evacuated; however, 
there were still individuals who refused to leave their homes.  On Tuesday, September 7, 
Mayor Nagin ordered a “forced” evacuation of New Orleans.55 That same day as political 
pressure mounted with respect to the response to Katrina’s aftermath, both the White 
House and the Congress pledged separate investigations.  
On September 7, President Bush called for an additional $52 billion in aid in 
addition to the $10.5 billion already approved.  The Congress responded by approving the 
request the following day. 
On the evening of September 15, President Bush delivered a prime time address 
to the nation from Jackson Square in New Orleans. In his speech, the President 
acknowledged the tragedy in New Orleans and pledged the support of the federal 
government in recovery operations stating, “we will do what it takes” to achieve 
recovery. In an attempt to comfort the nation and in particular the people of the Gulf 
Coast, the President stated; “There is no way to imagine America without New Orleans, 
and this great city will rise again.”56 
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Two days following the President’s speech in New Orleans, Tropical Depression 
18 developed 95 miles east of the Bahamas.57 The following day Tropical Storm Rita 
became the seventeenth named storm of the 2005 hurricane season.58   
By Tuesday, September 20, Hurricane Rita was a Category 2 hurricane and 
delivered a glancing blow to the Florida Keys.59  Although some areas lost power, 
damage was minimal.  The storm was, however, headed into the warm waters of the Gulf 
of Mexico, where Katrina had rapidly developed into a Category 5 hurricane. Indeed, 
Hurricane Rita quickly followed suit. By Wednesday, September 21, Hurricane Rita 
reached Category 5 status with winds of 175 miles per hour.60   
By September 22, the Bush Administration declared Hurricane Rita a national 
emergency.61 Preparations and evacuations began in the Houston/Galveston area.  
Evacuees from Louisiana were once again forced to flee.  This time they left in a greater 
exodus from southwest Louisiana and Texas.  Gasoline supplies, already stretched thin by 
Hurricane Katrina, were further limited.  The nation was preparing for the potential of $4-
5 per gallon gasoline with the threat that Hurricane Rita might further disrupt oil and gas 
operations in the Gulf of Mexico and the refineries and petro-chemical facilities in the 
vicinity of the Houston ship channel, Texas City, Baytown, Beaumont and Lake Charles.  
As a result of this concern, oil passed the $68/barrel mark.  These concerns were 
probably justified in light of the destruction to energy infrastructure from Hurricane 
Katrina.  
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On September 24, Hurricane Rita made landfall near Cameron, Louisiana as a 
Category 3 hurricane.62  The town of Cameron, was almost totally destroyed and the 
Louisiana cities of Lake Charles and Vinton, and the Texas cities of Orange, Beaumont 
and Port Arthur were severely damaged.63 
B. Overview of the Louisiana Judicial System  
The judicial system in Louisiana includes federal, state and municipal courts.  At 
the federal level, there are three judicial district courts: The United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Louisiana, The United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Louisiana and the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Louisiana.  There are also separate federal bankruptcy courts within each district.  
Geographically, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana has 
jurisdiction over the following parishes: Assumption, Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, 
Plaquemines, Saint Bernard, Saint Charles, Saint James, Saint John the Baptist, Saint 
Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne and Washington.  The Eastern District of Louisiana’s 
central courthouse is in New Orleans; however there is also a small courthouse in 
Houma.64  There are 12 active judges who sit on the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana.65 
The Middle District of Louisiana has jurisdiction over the following parishes: 
Ascension, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberville, Livingston, Pointe Coupee, Saint 
Helena, West Baton Rouge and West Feliciana.  The Middle District courthouse is 
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located in Baton Rouge.66 There are three active judges in the Middle District of 
Louisiana.67  
The Western District is the largest geographical district and has jurisdiction over 
the following parishes in south Louisiana among others in north and central Louisiana: 
Acadia, Allen, Calcasieu, Cameron, Jefferson Davis, Saint Martin, Saint Mary, and 
Vermilion. The Western District has its headquarters in Shreveport, but also has 
courthouses in Monroe, Alexandria, Opelousas, Lake Charles and Lafayette.68  There are 
seven active judges in the Western District.69 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which hears appeals 
from the district courts within the states of Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi has its 
headquarters in New Orleans.70  The Fifth Circuit has seventeen active judges.71 
The district courts of the United States are courts of limited jurisdiction.  These 
courts are only authorized to consider cases that fall within the jurisdiction conferred on 
the courts by statutes enacted by the Congress. As a general rule most cases that are 
presented to the federal district courts are cases that “arise under” federal laws or treaties 
of the United States or are controversies between citizens of different states when the 
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs.72  Special 
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jurisdictional statutes passed by Congress also extend jurisdiction to the federal courts in 
other limited circumstances.73 
There are three primary levels of courts of general jurisdiction in the state judicial 
system. Article V, §1 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 vests the state’s judicial 
power in “a supreme court, courts of appeal, district courts and other courts authorized by 
this article.” The Louisiana Supreme Court sits in New Orleans. There are seven justices 
who are elected from seven districts throughout Louisiana. Each Louisiana Supreme 
Court justice is elected for a ten year term.74   
Pursuant to the Louisiana Constitution, the Louisiana Supreme Court has general 
supervisory jurisdiction over other courts. It may “establish procedural and administrative 
rules not in conflict with law and may assign a sitting or retired judge to any court.”  The 
Louisiana Supreme Court also has sole authority to provide by rule for appointments of 
attorneys as temporary or ad hoc judges of city, municipal, traffic, parish, juvenile or 
family courts.75   
Article V, §8 of the Louisiana Constitution provides for intermediate appellate 
courts.  Article V, §8 states that the state shall be divided into “at least four circuits, with 
one court of appeal in each.”  The state is in fact divided into five circuits and has five 
circuit courts of appeal: The First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of 
Appeal.  The First Circuit Court of Appeals sits in Baton Rouge. The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals sits in Shreveport. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals sits in Lake 
Charles.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals sits in New Orleans.  The Fifth Circuit 
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Court of Appeals sits in Gretna.  The geographic jurisdiction of the five appellate circuits 
is shown on figure 1 below: 
 
Figure 1. Map of Louisiana Courts of Appeal76 
There are forty-one district courts having general jurisdiction over civil matters.77  
The First through Fourtieth Judicial District Courts sit throughout Louisiana. Some 
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judicial districts are comprised of a single parish while others are comprised of multiple 
parishes. With the exception of Orleans Parish, the district courts handle both civil and 
criminal matters.  In Orleans Parish, there are separate Criminal and Civil District 
Courts.78 These two courts are located in separate facilities within the city of New 
Orleans. The Civil District Court is located in the Central Business District and the 
Orleans Criminal Court is located on Tulane Avenue near Broad Street.  
Figure 2, below, shows the location of Louisiana’s district courts: 
 
Figure 2. Map of Louisiana District Courts.79 
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In addition to the district courts, there are several courts of “special jurisdiction” 
including Family and Juvenile Courts.  There are also “limited jurisdiction” parish courts, 
city courts, traffic courts, mayors’ courts and justice of the peace courts throughout the 
state.80 
Unlike in the federal system, where the Clerk of Court is a component of the 
district courts themselves, in Louisiana the Clerk of Court’s Office is authorized by the 
Constitution as an entity separate and apart from the court.  Although the Clerk of Court’s 
office is attached to the district courts, the Clerk is a constitutionally authorized position 
and the Clerk of Court for each parish independently elected.81  Also, unlike the federal 
system in which district court and appellate court judges are appointed by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate for life terms, all judges in the state system are elected.82 
There are approximately 274 active judges in the state courts of general 
jurisdiction (7 Supreme Court Justices, 54 Court of Appeal Judges, 213 district judges). 
This number does not include judges who sit on special and limited jurisdiction courts. 
During Hurricanes Katrina and Rita over a million citizens of Louisiana 
evacuated their homes and businesses.  As will be discussed below, this number included 
many of the 274 active state judges and federal district and appellate judges who sit in 
New Orleans metropolitan area including Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard and 
Plaquemines parishes.83  Also included in the evacuation of the greater New Orleans area 
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during Hurricane Katrina were approximately 7,000 attorneys or roughly one-third of the 
licensed attorneys in the State of Louisiana.84 With this number of judges, court 
personnel and attorneys impacted by Hurricane Katrina, it should not be surprising that 
Louisiana’s judicial system was severely adversely impacted by the storm.  
In fact, if one is to compare the judicial appellate court map (Figure 1 above) and 
the district court map (Figure 2 above) with a map of Louisiana’s coastal zone, it is 
readily apparent that the Louisiana Supreme Court, three of the five intermediate 
appellate courts (the Louisiana Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal) and at 
least twelve district courts (the 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 29th, 32nd, 34th 
and 40th judicial district courts) are situated in coastal parishes or near coastal parishes 
that are particularly vulnerable to the hazards associated with hurricanes.  This proximity 
to potential danger from hurricanes during the five month long hurricane season each 
year is enough by itself to warrant a close look at the preparation taken by these courts 
and the federal courts that are in a similar situation to prepare for these hazards. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
personnel continue to live in temporary housing in New Orleans); Loretta G. Whyte, One Year Later: 
Hurricane Katrina and the Courts Restoring Operations, 53 Sep Fed. Law. 38 (2006)(noting that “[a]lmost 
every member of the [United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana] suffered partial or 
complete destruction of his or her home”); Charles Fulbruge, One Year Later: Hurricane Katrina and the 
Courts: The Reaction of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to Hurricane Katrina, 53 SEP. Fed Law 35 
(2006)(estimating that thirty percent of the U.S. Fifth Circuit’s Clerk of Court and staff attorney’s office 
“lost everything.”); Sarah S. Vance, Justice After Disaster—What Hurricane Katrina Did to the Justice 
System in new Orleans, 51 How. L. J. 621, 627 (2007)(noting that “Almost all of the judges and many 
members of the staffs of the civil trial courts in Orleans Parish lost their homes.”). 
84
 See generally, Brenna G. Nava, Hurricane Katrina: The Duties and Responsibilities of an Attorney in the 
Wake of A Natural Disaster, 37 St. Mary’s L. J. 1153 (2006)(noting the impact of Hurricane Katrina on 
attorneys in Louisiana); Michael H. Rubin and Beth E. Abramson, Lessons Learned (The Hard Way) by 
Lawyers During Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 20 Oct Prob. & Prop. 25 (2006); Peter Applebome and 
Jonathan D. Glater, Storm and Crisis: The Lawyers: Storm Leaves Legal System in Shambles, New York 
Times A1 (September 9, 2005) available at 2005 WLNR 14201429 (noting that “more than a third of the 
state’s lawyers have lost their offices some for good”). 
27 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The topic of disaster planning in the courts is not a new concept. Prior disasters, 
both natural and man-made, have impacted court operations throughout the United States.  
For example, the Grand Forks Red River Floods, the Loma Prieta Earthquake, the 
Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah Building (which severely damaged the adjacent 
federal court) and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 have caused past 
disruptions to courts.85   
In 1998, a series of articles was published in a special edition of The Judge’s 
Journal. This series of articles focused on emergency preparations in the courts under a 
variety of circumstances. The articles included personal accounts of how various disasters 
had impacted courts throughout the country in the past ranging from courthouse fires to 
earthquakes.86 The articles also suggested that the courts needed to make disaster 
planning a priority.87 
Despite the early attention, emergency planning in the courts did not seem to be a 
high priority agenda item.  This changed on September 11, 2001, when terrorists struck 
the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The 
September 11 attack on New York is considered by many to be a “focusing event” with 
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respect to the topic of emergency planning in the courts.88  State and federal courts in 
Manhattan were in close proximity to the World Trade Center in downtown Manhattan.  
One court was located in the World Trade Center itself and other courts were in close 
proximity to the twin towers.  After the attack occurred, the courts were evacuated and 
access and communications were disrupted for several weeks.  Three state court security 
agents were killed when they went to the World Trade Center to assist with 
evacuations.89  
 Following the September 11th attack, academics and members of the judiciary 
focused more of their attention on court security and preparation of the courts for 
disasters—both natural and man-made. 
In September 2002, a year after the September 11th attacks, a meeting was 
convened in New York to discuss lessons learned from not only the September 11th 
attacks, but also from other disasters that have impacted court operations. During this 
three day conference, referred to as the “9-11 Summit,” judges and court administrators 
from courts that had previously been impacted by floods, tropical storms, the Oklahoma 
City bombing, the September 11 attacks and other disasters impacting courts throughout 
the country gathered to share their experiences and attempt to identify “best practices” to 
better prepare for similar events in the future.90  Leading academic members in the field 
of disaster planning also participated in the “9-11 Summit” meetings to offer insight on 
what could be done to prepare the judicial branch for future man-made and natural 
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disasters.91 The common themes that emerged from the presentations and workshops of 
the “9-11 Summit” were that there are several identifiable factors that lead to successful 
response of a court to disasters, both natural and man-made. The identified factors 
included the following: 1) strong court leadership during time of crisis and recovery, 2) 
careful planning and preparation for response and recovery, 3) clear lines of authority and 
designated responsibilities during times of crisis, 4) effective communications, both 
internal and external during and immediately after crisis, and 5) recognition that courts 
are comprised of people and that it is sometimes necessary to balance the needs of 
individual court personnel with the need to quickly resume operations. 
In 2003, the National Center for State Courts Best Practices Institute published a 
report that set forth recommended best practices for state courts to prepare for 
emergencies.92  The National Center for State Court’s report identified seven best 
practices as “starting points” for courts to review and formulate their emergency plans.  
The identified seven “best practices” include: 1) “ensuring visible court leadership,” 2) 
“surveying and prioritizing emergency needs,” 3) “creating and practicing an emergency 
response plan,” 4) “’getting a seat at the table’ in city, county or state emergency 
management meetings,” 5) “developing a plan to communicate internally,” 6) 
“developing a plan to communicate externally,” and 7) “not letting resources prevent 
planning.”93 As will be discussed below, these practices represent good benchmarks 
against which to measure the Louisiana judiciary’s preparation for and response to 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
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There is a limited amount of literature specifically addressing the preparation and 
response of the courts to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. A few first hand accounts of the 
various courts’ responses following the hurricanes may be found in reports issued by the 
Louisiana Supreme Court and its staff,94 the Office of the U.S. Judicial Administrator,95 
and articles written by judges and staff of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal96 and the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.97   
In an article written in the Howard Law Journal, Judge Sarah Vance, one of the 
twelve active judges of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, provides one of the most comprehensive accounts of the state court and 
federal court response to Hurricane Katrina, “tracking developments in both the state and 
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federal court systems from the immediate aftermath of the storm to shortly after its 
second anniversary.”98  With respect to the state court system, however, Judge Vance’s 
comments focus primarily on problems associated with the criminal court system in 
Orleans Parish after Hurricane Katrina and efforts to reform this component of the state 
court system following Hurricane Katrina.  With the exception of a limited citation to a 
telephone interview with Judge Madeleine Landrieu, very little is mentioned about the 
state of Louisiana’s civil court system. 
 Almost immediately following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, R. Eric Petersen, 
prepared a Congressional Research Service Report for Congress entitled “Emergency 
Preparedness and Continuity of Operations (COOP) Planning in the Federal Judiciary” in 
which the importance of court planning for emergency conditions was expressed.99  The 
CRS report noted the progress of courts’ planning for emergencies following the 
September 11th attacks.  The author then set forth several policy considerations and raised 
questions concerning the current status of the judicial branches’ continuity of operations 
plans, urging that particularly in light of the recent disasters, courts and Congress should 
consider additional measures to plan for and insure continuity of court operations 
following disasters.100  One of the suggested measures was adoption of provisions 
allowing courts to hold sessions outside of their normal places of business in the event 
that emergency conditions warranted a change of venue. Congress subsequently passed 
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emergency legislation authorizing extraterritorial operations of courts in times of 
emergencies.101  Louisiana has not passed a similar comprehensive procedure; however, 
the Louisiana Legislature did authorize courts to conduct criminal proceedings outside of 
their normal territorial jurisdiction in times of emergency pursuant to orders of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court and Clerks of Court to establish ancillary offices outside their 
home parishes in times of emergency.102 
Two scholars, Thomas A. Birkland and Carrie A. Schneider, have written an 
article titled “Emergency Management in the Courts: Trends After September 11 and 
Hurricane Katrina,” that examines current trends of the courts to prepare for large scale 
disasters in the wake of the September 11 attack and Hurricane Katrina.103  This article 
builds on prior work of Professor Birkland that previously examined lessons learned by 
the judiciary with respect to disaster planning after the September 11th attacks.104  In the 
2007 article, Birkland and Schneider argue that although Hurricane Katrina was different 
than other disasters due to its widespread geographic impact, disasters have common 
elements, including disruption of the normal functioning of government, economic and 
social disruption, as well as bringing a degree of uncertainty to citizens with respect to 
their future.  Likewise, the authors note that there are common elements to preparing for 
disasters.   
In reviewing many of the guidance documents available to courts, Birkland and 
Schneider note that common themes emerge: 1) court leadership is important in preparing 
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for and responding to disasters, 2) courts must set priorities in responding to disasters, 3) 
preparation plans are important but the process of planning is more important to 
successful management and response to disasters and 4) communications are a key 
element of a court’s response.105 
With respect to communications, the Birkland and Schneider state that there are 
four key elements: 1) technology for communicating with key personnel during and 
immediately after the crisis, 2) having a process for communicating with court personnel, 
3) having a process and plan for handing data communications and record access, and 4) 
having an external communication plan for communicating with external stakeholders.106  
These common elements are, for the most part, the same elements identified by court 
officials during working sessions of the “9-11 Summit” in September, 2006.  Despite 
having identified common factors of court planning for disasters and emergencies, the 
authors argue that there is still a need for further systematic research with respect to court 
planning for emergencies.  In particular, the authors identify five additional research 
questions: 1) “What are the most common threats to court security?” 2) “What are the 
most consequential threats to court security?” 3) “How do these threats vary by 
jurisdiction?” 4) “Is planning uniform within or between jurisdictions? What explains the 
variation in planning? Leadership differences? The nature of the courts’ organization in a 
state?” 5) “Are “lessons” really “learned” from past events? Or are lessons or aphorisms 
merely observed, without any action being taken?” 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Following the foregoing literature review, research methodology was adopted in 
order to more fully evaluate the impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the Louisiana 
Judicial System.  In performing typical legal research one starts with a legal question and 
then reviews existing statutes and case law to derive an answer.  This traditional 
methodology was not sufficient for determining how Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
impacted the judicial system. 
In order to research the impact Hurricanes Katrina and Rita had on the court 
system in Louisiana, existing literature that discusses how other courts have responded to 
disasters of varying scales including earthquakes, floods and terrorist attacks was 
examined. Published and unpublished accounts of what the state and federal courts did in 
the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to respond to the disasters and how the 
courts altered their contingency plans to prepare for future disasters were also reviewed. 
Interviews with several individuals who participated in court response to the 
Hurricanes were also conducted.  The individuals interviewed included the Honorable 
Madeleine Landrieu, Judge of the Civil District Court of Orleans Parish, who was 
appointed Chairperson of the Louisiana District Judges Association’s Committee on 
Disaster Recovery Planning following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Honorable John 
T. Olivier, Clerk of the Louisiana Supreme Court during the time period before, during 
and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and General Hunt Downer, assistant adjutant 
general of the Louisiana National Guard (also a Louisiana practicing attorney). Personal 
statements of several judges, which were provided to the Louisiana District Judges 
Association’s Disaster Recovery Planning committee and whose courts were directly 
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impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, were also examined to determine how those 
judges and the courts over which they presided responded to the hurricanes.   
Additional data including court case load statistics, where available, was reviewed 
to gain a general understanding of the impact of the hurricanes on the courts’ dockets. 
Additionally, electronic legal research was conducted through commercial services and 
court’s electronic records systems to gain a general understanding of the types of disputes 
that were being considered by the courts in Louisiana following Hurricane’s Katrina and 
Rita and how the courts were managing their dockets following the storms.   
Finally, with respect to the impact of Hurricane’s Katrina and Rita on lawyers and 
law firms within Louisiana, published accounts as well as personal experience and 
interviews with several affected attorneys were considered to determine the types of 
impacts that the hurricanes had on practicing attorneys and their law firms. 
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IV. DISCUSSION  
A. Legal Infrastructure 
Unlike prior hurricanes which affected only limited areas and closed public 
buildings, including courts, for relatively short periods of time, Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita forced closure of some courthouses across the State of Louisiana for prolonged 
periods.  Although initial reports in the news media claimed that the court system had 
been devastated, these reports were, for the most part, premature and exaggerated 
focusing primarily on the Orleans Parish Criminal court system.107   
Although a number of courthouses, particularly those in St. Bernard, 
Plaquemines, Orleans, Jefferson, Vermilion, Cameron and Calcasieu Parishes were 
physically inaccessible for periods of time following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the 
primary problem was not with the courthouses themselves.   
Despite initial reports of flooding, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals John Minor 
Wisdom Courthouse in New Orleans suffered only a few broken windows.108  The United 
States District Court for the Eastern District’s New Orleans courthouse likewise suffered 
very little physical damage. 
Chief Justice Calogaro of the Louisiana Supreme Court, reported that twenty state 
courthouses suffered some degree of damage from the storms. The Supreme Court’s 
Royal Street headquarters in New Orleans suffered minor flooding when the lack of 
electricity caused the basement’s sump system to cease functioning.109  The Civil District 
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Court in New Orleans also suffered minor damage when water and sewerage backed up 
into its basement. 
By far the most significant damage to courthouse infrastructure from Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita was caused to courthouses that were located in vulnerable areas to begin 
with.  The courts in St. Bernard Parish and the Criminal District Court in Orleans Parish 
were located in low lying areas that suffered severe flooding after Hurricane Katrina.  
The courthouse in Cameron Parish is located within a mile from the shores of the Gulf 
and was inundated by storm surge from Hurricane Rita.  Those courts that sat on higher 
ground suffered minimal physical damage from the storms. 
An examination of flood maps prepared by NOAA with court locations shows the 
relative vulnerability of courts in the New Orleans area to flooding. Figure 3 shows the 
depth of flood waters in St. Bernard, Orleans, Jefferson and Plaquemines Parishes on 
August 31, 2005 following Hurricane Katrina. The location of key courthouses has been 
plotted on this map.  A similar map showing the flooding on September 15, 2005 is seen 
in Figure 4. The Orleans Parish Criminal Court was located in an area that was inundated 
with 5-7 feet of floodwater. The Orleans Parish Civil District Court was in an area 
inundated with 1-3 feet of floodwater. The courts in St. Bernard Parish were likewise 
vulnerable to flooding. However, the federal court complex (the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals and U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana), the Louisiana 
Supreme Court and the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (located in the same 
building on Royal Street), the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and 24th Judicial 
District Court (located in the same building in Jefferson Parish) and the 25th Judicial 
District Court (Plaquemines Parish) were on higher ground and therefore more insulated 
from the adverse effects of the flooding following Hurricane Katrina.  
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Figure 3. Courthouse Locations Plotted Against NOAA Flood Depths 
August 31, 2005 
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Figure 4. Courthouse Locations Plotted Against NOAA Flood Depths 
September 15, 2005 
 The biggest impact on the courts was not the flooding but the fact that judges, 
courtroom deputies, clerk of court personnel, security personnel, court reporters, and 
other staff were, like their fellow citizens, displaced by the storms. The lack of access to 
the courthouses due to lack of electricity and other public utilities as well as severe 
damage to surrounding infrastructure and the mandatory evacuations of the Orleans and 
Jefferson Parishes following Hurricanes Katrina, were major impediments to accelerated 
re-opening of the courts.  Similar problems with access existed in Cameron Parish 
following Hurricane Rita.  
Limited access following a widespread disaster is not surprising and should have 
been planned for by the courts prior to the storms.  Limited access to courthouse facilities 
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following disasters was certainly discussed by many judges and court administrators at 
the “9-11 Summit” in September, 2001 and was experienced by courts in previous 
disasters including the Grand Forks Red River Flooding in 1997, Tropical Storm Allison 
in Houston, Texas, the September 11th attacks on New York and the destruction of the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals following the Loma Prieta earthquake in San Francisco.  
The courts that had continuity of operations plans did take lack of access into account; 
however, it was not anticipated that the destruction associated with Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita would be so widespread and that the courts would be prevented from effectively 
using their home courthouses for such a prolonged period of time.110 
 The following sections discuss the storms’ impacts on specific Louisiana federal 
and state courts and how these courts prepared for the coming storms, reacted during the 
immediate aftermath and further developed or refined plans for dealing with future 
disasters. 
B. The Federal Courts 
According to Judge Sarah Vance, “[t]he recovery of the federal justice system 
after Katrina was faster and smoother in no small part because the federal judiciary had 
better access to resources and technology, and, as a result of the events of September 11, 
2001, it had a plan in place for continuity of operations.”111 Judge Vance attributes the 
slower recovery of the state judiciary to the fact that the state judiciary “had fewer 
resources and was less technologically sophisticated to begin with, had no plan for 
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continuity of operations in the event of emergency, and it suffered far greater damage to 
its physical plant and communication system than the federal system did.”112  
Judge Vance was certainly correct in many respects. As a direct result of the 
September 11th attacks, the federal judiciary was strongly encouraged to prepare 
continuity of operations plans.113  As a result of this planning, the United States Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans and the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana in New Orleans had continuity of operations plans in place 
prior to Hurricane Katrina.  According to Judge Edith Clement, circuit judge of the U.S. 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first 
circuit court in the United States to hire an emergency preparedness coordinator.114 The 
Fifth Circuit’s emergency preparedness coordinator assisted the court in developing its 
continuity of operations plan (“COOP”).  According to Judge Clement, “[t]hough the 
court deviated from the COOP due to the unprecedented circumstances created by 
Katrina, the key issues posed by the emergency already had been identified. For example, 
the court had determined the minimum square footage required for a temporary 
headquarters, how to handle automation issues, and how to assist staff relocation.  The 
COOP proved invaluable in quickly reestablishing operations.”115  The federal courts also 
had vast resources, including those from the General Services Administration, the U.S. 
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Marshall Service and the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts available to them to assist 
with relocation and re-establishment of operations. 
Although the federal courts’ physical facilities were relatively unharmed, the 
federal courts nevertheless faced the challenge of access to their respective headquarters 
and the impact that the Hurricanes had on their personnel. According to Judge Vance 
“[a]bout 75% of the federal district court judges and court staff in New Orleans either lost 
their homes or suffered serious damage.”116 
Fortunately, the Fifth Circuits’ computer records and files were unharmed during 
the storm and subsequent flooding.117 In the days following Hurricane Katrina, a 
contingent of Fifth Circuit court personnel, accompanied by deputies of U.S. Marshall 
Service was dispatched to New Orleans to retrieve court servers and records so that 
operations could resume in the Fifth Circuit’s temporary quarters in Houston.118 
Communications were an issue following Hurricane Katrina for the U.S. Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Although the courts had planned for communications with 
employees by directing them to contact the court’s emergency numbers for information, 
phone systems and communications were down in the days following the storm thereby 
hindering the ability of court personnel to obtain information through the court’s 
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emergency phone system.119 Since the Fifth Circuit’s computer systems were backed up 
offsite, communications via email were soon re-established.120 
By order of Chief Judge Carolyn King, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals Clerk of Court’s New Orleans office was declared closed as of the close of 
business on August 26, 2005 (Friday) until further order of the court.121  Attorneys were 
directed to file emergency pleadings addressing emergency matters such as death penalty 
appeals with execution dates, deportation proceedings with confirmed deportation dates 
in Houston from August 27 through September 20, 2005. The period from August 26 
through October 11, 2005 was deemed a “legal holiday” for regular business such as civil 
and criminal appeals. Following October 11, 2005, regular filings were ordered to resume 
in the Clerk of Court’s temporary office in Houston. Oral arguments were subsequently 
held in Houston and Austin, Texas.122  The Fifth Circuit returned to New Orleans and 
resumed full operations in the John Minor Wisdom Court Building on January 18, 2006.   
Although the Fifth Circuit was able to operate from temporary offices in Houston, 
Texas almost immediately following Hurricane Katrina, the District Court was not 
authorized by law to hold session outside of the geographic confines of the Eastern 
District of Louisiana.123  This presented an additional impediment to resumption of 
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normal operations by the district courts.  Although authorization for district courts to hold 
sessions outside their normal geographic jurisdictions had been discussed prior to 
Hurricane Katrina, the Congress had not yet enacted legislation authorizing such 
action.124 
The geographic jurisdiction of the United States District Courts is generally a 
large area. In some states, such as Louisiana, there are multiple United States District 
Courts that have several parishes or counties within their geographic jurisdiction.125 In 
other states the geographic jurisdictional area of the federal district court encompasses the 
entire state.126 Absent authority to operate outside of its normal geographic jurisdiction, 
the United States District Court could not immediately relocate and resume operations 
following Hurricane Katrina. Although there was a small satellite courthouse in Houma, 
Louisiana that services the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, this courthouse was insufficient to handle the needs of the entire Eastern 
District Court.127   
Within days of Hurricane Katrina, the Congress passed emergency legislation, 
known as the Federal Judiciary Emergency Special Sessions Act of 2005, to address the 
issue of federal district court authority to hold emergency sessions outside of the court’s 
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district during times of emergency.128  The Federal Judiciary Emergency Special Sessions 
Act of 2005 specifically granted authority to the district courts to hold, “[s]pecial sessions 
of the district court…at such places within the United States outside the district as the 
nature of the business may require and upon such notice as the court orders, upon a 
finding…that, because of emergency conditions, no location within the district is 
reasonably available where such special sessions could be held.”129 The only exception to 
conducting business outside of the geographic confines of the district was that, “a 
criminal trial may not be conducted at a special session outside the State in which the 
crime has been committed unless the defendant consents to such a criminal trial.”130  
Therefore, with the passage of the Federal Judiciary Emergency Special Sessions Act, in 
times of emergency, the vast majority of the business of the federal district courts, 
including trials in civil proceedings as well as pre-trial proceedings in criminal cases, can 
now be conducted anywhere in the United States. This legislation should prove 
invaluable during future large scale disasters.131 
Following passage of the Federal Judiciary Emergency Special Sessions Act, in 
addition to the court’s satellite office in Houma, Louisiana, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana was immediately authorized to hold sessions 
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in Baton Rouge (Middle District of Louisiana), Lafayette (Western District of Louisiana) 
and Houston (Southern District of Texas).132  
Although the federal district court in New Orleans quickly acquired physical 
facilities from which it could operate, it immediately became evident that displacement of 
stakeholders would make it difficult to quickly resume normal operations. Therefore, on 
August 31, 2005, Chief Judge Ginger Berrigan issued a global order continuing all 
criminal matters for three months.133 A separate order was issued by Chief Judge 
Berrigan on September 2, 2005, suspending all deadlines and delays in civil matters until 
further order of the court.134  Another order was issued on November 3, 2005, lifting the 
suspension of civil deadlines and delays in civil cases effective November 25, 2005, a 
date which corresponded with analogous executive orders issued by Governor Blanco 
and by the Louisiana Supreme Court applicable to proceedings in State courts.135  
The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana set up a temporary office 
in Lafayette, Louisiana to receive pleadings and court notices.136 The filings received by 
the Clerk of Court in Lafayette were distributed to the court’s satellite offices.  According 
to Judge Vance, “[b]y October 3, 2005, the Eastern District of Louisiana was fully 
operational at all temporary locations.”137 
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Among the displaced individuals following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were 
roughly one-third of the licensed attorneys in Louisiana.138  Many of the displaced 
lawyers, especially those with offices in the metropolitan New Orleans area had no access 
to their offices, files or computer systems.  The federal courts and several state and local 
bar associations assisted attorneys by establishing communication centers to set up 
temporary email accounts.  Access fees to the federal district court’s Public Access to 
Courts Electronic Records (PACER) system were waived so that attorneys could 
reconstruct pleadings files from remote locations.139  At the time, the United States 
District courts had already implemented an electronic filing system for all pleadings. This 
system proved invaluable because, with a computer, internet line and password, displaced 
attorneys could continue to file necessary pleadings with the court from any location.  
Other courts, including the U.S. Fifth Circuit and state courts had not yet implemented 
electronic filing and records systems.   
The Eastern District of Louisiana returned to its home office in New Orleans on 
November 1, 2005 and resumed the majority of its operations; however, criminal and 
civil trials did not resume until January 2006.140  An early resumption of operations 
allowed the federal district court in New Orleans to assist the state criminal court in 
Orleans Parish by allocating two courtrooms to house state court judges to conduct 
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limited proceedings, exclusive of trials (the Orleans Parish Criminal Court building 
which was located on Tulane Avenue near Broad Street was heavily damaged by 
flooding).141 
Overall, the federal court planning for and response to Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita was quite good.  Although the court’s existing continuity of operations plans had to 
be altered due to existing conditions, those alterations were made with relative ease.  The 
federal courts had clearly gone through the process of planning prior to Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita.  This planning process paid dividends when the Hurricanes struck.  
Likewise, the federal courts had strong leadership.  Chief Judge King of the Fifth Circuit 
and Chief Judge Berrigan of the federal district court worked with their respective 
colleagues on the bench and court staffs to lead the courts through the crisis that was 
presented following the Hurricanes.  The prior planning coupled with good leadership 
and technology allowed the federal courts to resume operations in an expedited fashion.   
C. The State Courts 
 Although less formally prepared, the state courts in Louisiana appear to have 
attempted to effectively respond to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita following the storms.  
According to Louisiana Supreme Court Clerk of Court John Olivier, the Supreme Court 
had begun working on a continuity of operations plan before Hurricane Katrina.  
However, this plan had not been completed at the time that the storm struck.142  The 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s continuity of operations plan had been discussed in an 
administrative conference in June 2005, but was not scheduled to be discussed again until 
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September.143 Few if any of the lower courts in the state system had continuity of 
operations plans in place. 
The State Court system in the affected parishes also presented a different scenario 
from both a legal and practical standpoint from its sister federal courts. Since the 
Louisiana Constitution of 1864, there has been a constitutional mandate that the 
Louisiana Court system must operate. Article I, Section 22 of the Louisiana Constitution 
of 1974 provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate 
remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without denial partiality, or 
unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, reputation or other rights.”144  This 
clear provision seemingly presents a legal problem when circumstances dictate that the 
courts are physically inaccessible and functionally unable to operate. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court and the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal 
are located in the French Quarter. While the building in which these courts are located 
did not receive significant floodwaters, it was for all practical purposes inaccessible in the 
weeks following Hurricane Katrina. There was no electricity, sewerage or water. 
Moreover, security concerns existed for court personnel as well as those with business 
before the court due to civil unrest in New Orleans. 
 When Hurricane Katrina struck, the Justices of the Supreme Court and court 
personnel had evacuated to various locations. Since Baton Rouge escaped significant 
impact from Hurricane Katrina and was accessible, the Supreme Court relied upon 
Justice Catherine Kimball, who is from the Baton Rouge area, as its primary point of 
contact.   
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The Louisiana Supreme Court quickly set up temporary headquarters in the state 
office building in Baton Rouge that houses the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals.  
The court first contacted the Justices and key court employees. By the end of the first 
week following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, key personnel had relocated to Baton Rouge 
and were working from the First Circuit’s offices. Although the court issued a closure 
order following Hurricane Katrina, the court continued to accept emergency filings. 
 During the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, members of the Supreme Court’s 
staff, accompanied by State Police and court security officers, returned to New Orleans to 
retrieve servers and key material for re-establishing the court’s computer infrastructure.  
Once retrieved, server space was acquired in the Baton Rouge area.  Resumption of 
computer operations allowed the court to utilize its web page as a means of 
communicating with the public and attorneys with business before the court.  The Court 
also worked with officers of the Louisiana Bar Association to disseminate 
communications to the public and members of the bar following the storms. 
 The Supreme Court ultimately returned to New Orleans in late November 2005 
and resumed normal operations at its headquarters on December 1, 2005. 
Following Hurricane Katrina, 24th Judicial Court (Jefferson Parish) Judge Robert 
Pitre, Jr. provided a written account of his court’s experience during Hurricane Katrina to 
the Disaster Planning and Recovery Committee of the Louisiana District Judges 
Association.145  According to Judge Pitre, the 24th Judicial District Court’s five story 
building in Gretna, received only minor damage. However the Liberto Building, an 
ancillary building, suffered major damage and had to be torn down. Unfortunately the 
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court’s computer servers were located in the Liberto building and suffered some 
damages; however the servers were retrieved, restored and moved to a useable building 
following the storm.  However, due to a lack of electricity, communications and 
infrastructure damage, the court’s computer and email servers were not operational 
immediately following the storm.  Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the court 
began working with a computer back up service in Baton Rouge to provide it with the 
ability to communicate in the event of future loss of power, computer and telephone lines.   
By October 10, 2005, all of the judges of the 24th Judicial District Court were 
back in the New Orleans area and were ready to resume operations.  According to Judge 
Pitre, the criminal docket of the 24th Judicial District Court was slightly reduced 
immediately following the storms.  Although jury trials resumed in early 2006, in the 24th 
Judicial District Court, according to Judge Pitre, the Clerk of Court had to issue over 
1,000 notices to secure a jury pool of about 100 jurors.146 Although the reason for the 
10:1 ratio of notices to jury pool members is unclear, it may be indicative of the fact that 
citizens in Jefferson Parish were either unable (either because they were not able to be 
served with the jury notices at former addresses) or unwilling to resume jury service in 
the months following the storm. 
Like the 24th Judicial District Court in Jefferson Parish, the 25th Judicial District 
Court for Plaquemines Parish was also temporarily inaccessible following Hurricane 
Katrina.  Judge William Roe of the 25th Judicial District Court also provided a written 
statement to the Louisiana District Judges Association’s Committee on Disaster 
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Planning.147  According to Judge Roe, the members of his court, like those of other courts 
in the area, believed that they would only be away for a few days following Hurricane 
Katrina.  Following the storm, effective communications were non-existent.  According 
to Judge Roe, he and the other judge of the 25th Judicial District Court could not 
communicate with one another or with law enforcement officials in Plaquemines Parish. 
Re-establishing communications with Judge Roe’s staff took weeks following Hurricane 
Katrina.  Judge Roe was away from his home for three weeks following Hurricane 
Katrina and in his statement to the District Judges Association, Judge Roe identified the 
lack of housing for court personnel as a significant challenge for the court.  According to 
Judge Roe, it was not until December 2005 that all of the court’s employees secured 
FEMA housing. Also, in Plaquemines Parish, the Parish Prison and Juvenile Detention 
Facility were totally destroyed thereby challenging the resumption of normal criminal 
operations.  Judge Roe also identified juror availability as a significant post-Katrina 
impediment to resumption of court operations.  
Interestingly, at the time of Hurricane Katrina, the 25th Judicial District Court was 
housed in a temporary facility in Belle Chase, Louisiana.  The parish seat of Plaquemines 
Parish is actually in East Pointe-a-la Hache. The courthouse in East Point-a-la-Hache was 
destroyed in a fire several years before Hurricane Katrina struck and the court relocated 
to Belle Chase.  If the court had been located in Point-a-la-Hache the physical damage to 
the courthouse surely would have been far more severe, as the area is situated near the 
mouth of the Mississippi River. It has limited hurricane levee protection and was on the 
eastern side of Hurricane Katrina at landfall.  Point-a-la Hache suffered significant 
damage due to Hurricane Katrina’s twenty to thirty foot storm surge.    
                                                 
147
 A copy of Judge Roe’s written statement is also in the author’s files. 
53 
Other district courts in the New Orleans area were damaged to some extent and 
also were inaccessible in the days following Hurricane Katrina.  In particular, the 34th 
Judicial District Courthouse in St. Bernard Parish, located in Chalmette, Louisiana was 
one of the courts hit hardest by Hurricane Katrina.  Located in the midst of the massive 
flooding in St. Bernard Parish, this courthouse received significant floodwaters and was 
physically inaccessible for an extended period of time.   
The Orleans Parish Civil Court is located near the Louisiana Superdome on 
Loyola Avenue in New Orleans. Although the courthouse was on the fringe of severe 
flooding, the courthouse itself received only minor damage from flooding in the 
basement.  However, like the other courts in the New Orleans area, access following the 
storm was the primary limiting factor to resumption of operations.  Following Hurricane 
Katrina, the court conducted temporary operations in Baton Rouge and later moved to 
other temporary offices in Gonzales, Louisiana.148  The Civil District Court did not return 
to its building until late 2005 and did not resume jury trials until mid 2006.149 
Similar situations arose when Hurricane Rita struck the southwest portion of the 
state. Courts in Vermilion, Cameron and Calcasieu parishes were inaccessible for a 
period of time. Other courts in southwest Louisiana, such as those in Allan, Lafayette and 
Acadia parishes, were also declared closed for a limited period of time.  Unlike in New 
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, there was no prolonged period of flooding or evacuation 
in southwest Louisiana following Hurricane Rita.   
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The most significant impact following Hurricane Rita occurred to the 38th Judicial 
District Court in Cameron, Parish.  The courthouse for the 38th Judicial District Court is 
located in Cameron, Louisiana, ground zero for Hurricane Rita’s landfall. 
Judge Ward Fontenot provided an interesting overview of the impact of Hurricane 
Rita on his court in a written statement to the Louisiana District Judges Association.  The 
38th Judicial District Court is located in Cameron, Louisiana and is situated less than a 
mile from the coast. It is probably the most vulnerable court location in Louisiana with 
respect to hazards presented by hurricanes. 
According to Judge Fontenot, when it became evident that Hurricane Rita would 
approach Cameron Parish, there was no question that a total evacuation of the low-lying 
Cameron Parish would be necessary.  Cameron Parish had learned a deadly lesson in 
1957 when Hurricane Audry killed 600 citizens.  According to Judge Fontenot, Cameron 
Parish’s evacuation had 100% compliance and not a single resident perished during 
Hurricane Rita.150 
Like its sister courts in southeast Louisiana, the assumption was that Hurricane 
Rita would strike over a weekend and that the district court in Cameron would resume 
normal operations the following Monday, September 26, 2005.  
The courthouse in Cameron is a depression era concrete and steel structure that 
was built in 1938.  The Clerk of Court’s office is on the first and second floors and the 
judges offices and courtrooms are on the third floor.  According to Judge Fontenot, on 
Wednesday, September 21, the clerk’s office started moving files, computer equipment 
and other resources to the third floor putting the materials in the Judge’s office and 
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courtroom.  Unlike some of the other courts, the 38th Judicial Court Clerk instituted an 
“electronic” records retention system in 1957 by microfilming all court filings and storing 
back ups of the records in Alexandria, Louisiana. According to Judge Fontenot, in 
approximately 1996, the Clerk started scanning all filings on a hard drive which was 
backed up daily offsite.151 
Judge Fontenot classified the damage following Hurricane Rita’s landfall as 
“more than had been anticipated or imagined.”152  Like in the New Orleans area, lack of 
communications was a significant problem in Cameron Parish.  There was no electricity, 
land phone lines or cell phone service.  Judge Fontenot indicated that there was no way 
for him to contact law enforcement or parish officials immediately following Hurricane 
Rita.  Judge Fontenot also was not able to contact his own secretary until October 4, 
2005, almost two weeks after Hurricane Rita’s landfall. 
According to Judge Fontenot, despite suffering a “tsunami-type” storm surge of 
ten to twelve feet, the courthouse in Cameron was still in tact. The judges’ office on the 
third floor and the Clerk of Court’s office on the second floor were above the water line 
and escaped significant damage. However the first floor of the courthouse was inundated 
with water and mud.153  Despite this damage, the courthouse in Cameron was the only 
useable building left in lower Cameron Parish following Hurricane Rita.154   
This presented a new impediment to use of the courthouse for normal court 
operations--- use of the courthouse for recovery operations. According to Judge Fontenot, 
the upper floors of the courthouse were “commandeered” for emergency services 
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following the storm.  The courtroom became an office for the Army and Judge Fontenot’s 
chambers became the officers’ “bunkhouse.”  Once FEMA moved into the parish that 
agency also utilized existing space on the upper floors of the courthouse. 
By the week of October 14, 2005, Judge Fontenot began coordinating his court’s 
recovery with the Supreme Court and Judge Mike Canaday, Chief Judge of the 14th 
Judicial District Court in neighboring Calcasieu Parish. Temporary offices were provided 
to the 38th Judicial District Court at the 14th Judicial District Court’s office in Lake 
Charles.  The Clerk of Court for the 38th Judicial District Court set up temporary offices 
in Jennings, Louisiana in Jefferson Davis Parish.  A satellite Clerk of Court’s office was 
later set up in Grand Lake, Louisiana in northern Cameron Parish.155 
The 38th Judicial District Court did not return to its home courthouse in Cameron, 
Louisiana until April, 2006. Even by April, widespread devastation still existed in 
Cameron.  There were no restaurants, grocery stores or service stations.  When the court 
did resume operations, the Clerk would send out notices to the prospective jurors telling 
them that they had to bring their own food and a full tank of gas.  They were also told 
that the only medical care in the vicinity of the court would be an ambulance team and a 
medical evacuation helicopter.  Despite these severe conditions, Judge Fontenot reported 
that the court had a surprisingly good response to summons, subpoenas and other court 
communications.156 
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In order to facilitate lawyers, the 38th Judicial District Court arranged for a large 
trailer to be located in the courthouse parking lot outfitted with office furniture, 
telephones and faxes.157 
Although some of the district courts and clerks of court established satellite 
offices and operations in neighboring parishes, their legal authority at the time to do so is 
questionable.  Unlike the federal legislation following Hurricane Katrina which expressly 
authorized the federal district courts to operate outside their respective jurisdictions 
during times of emergency, no such express authorization existed at the time for the state 
courts or clerks of court.  Subsequently, however, the Louisiana Legislature did authorize 
district courts to conduct criminal proceedings in locations other than their home parishes 
during times of emergency.158  The clerks of court were also authorized to establish 
satellite offices in any parish during times of emergency.159 
D. Legal Concerns Arising from Court Closures 
The closure of the courts necessitated that steps be taken to ensure that no legal 
rights were lost during closure and that essential legal rights were enforced during that 
same period of time. 
There were several concerns in this regard in both the civil and criminal context.  
The first concern was that many substantive rights might be extinguished by law if 
actions to enforce those rights were not taken in a timely fashion.   
In the civil context laws governing liberative prescription, prescription of non-use 
and preemption specify the time periods within which rights must be exercised or lost.  In 
the criminal context, criminals may only be held for limited periods of time without being 
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charged and these criminals are guaranteed a right to a speedy trial.  If these individuals 
are not charged and tried in a timely fashion they must be set free.  
A second concern was that rights in pending cases might be forfeited in a number 
of ways if deadlines imposed by statutes or rules were not met.  For example, if an 
appellate brief is not filed in a timely fashion the opposition is waived.   
A third concern existed because of procedural requirements related to the specific 
courts, or venues, in which matters must be brought and the authority of the specific court 
within a given geographic area (jurisdiction) to act outside of that area, by holding 
hearings or empanelling juries.  Although some district courts and clerks of court 
established ancillary offices in other parishes, their authority to do so was questionable. 
Following Hurricane Katrina initial steps were taken by Governor Blanco 
pursuant to the authority granted by the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency 
Assistance and Disaster Recovery Act of 1993 to protect legal rights.  Under the authority 
of La. R.S. 29:724(A) significant emergency power is vested in the Governor of 
Louisiana including the power to suspend provisions of statutes. 
Utilizing this authority, Governor Blanco issued three successive executive orders 
on the topic of “Emergency Suspension of Prescription, Peremption and Other Legal 
Deadlines.”  The first was KBB 2005-32, issued on September 6, 2005.  Although this 
order was issued on September 6, 2005 it was specifically declared to be retroactive 
“from Monday, August 29, 2005 through Sunday, September 25, 2005.”160  The order 
noted that a gubernatorial proclamation of a state of emergency under the Louisiana 
Homeland Security Act had been declared.  It specifically recited that clients and lawyers 
could not contact each other; that the state constitution required that courts be “open” and 
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they could not be open; that a “profound impact on the basic rights to [sic] an untold 
number of persons” might occur unless action were taken to suspend the effects of the 
tolling of legal delays; and that various attorney organizations had requested the 
Governor to, “suspend all deadlines applicable to legal proceedings, including 
prescription and preemption, in all Louisiana state courts, administrative agencies and 
boards.” Based on these circumstances the order announced that “All deadlines in legal 
proceedings, including liberative and preemptive periods in all courts, administrative 
agencies, and boards are hereby suspended until at least September 25, 2005, including, 
but not limited to, any such deadlines set for [sic] in the following:…”  The order went on 
to list the Louisiana Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Civil Code Ancillaries, 
Title 13 as to courts and judicial procedure, Title 23 as to workers’ compensation and 
Title 40 as to medical malpractice as specific sources of deadlines that were being 
suspended.  Notably, the order made no reference to the authority of the Supreme Court 
or the legislature to alter the suspension. 
On September 23, 2005, as Hurricane Rita was approaching the shores of 
Louisiana, the Governor issued Executive Order KBB 2005-48.   The primary objective 
of this executive order was to extend Executive Order KBB 2005-32 from September 25, 
2005 through October 25, 2005.  A thirty day extension of executive orders issued under 
the authority of the Louisiana Homeland Security Act is authorized by La. R. S. 
29:724(B)(1).  There were minor differences in the two orders.  Unlike the first executive 
order, the second makes specific reference to “non-constitutionally mandated deadlines in 
criminal proceedings.” Another paragraph was added which provided that the 
“suspension of laws as provided in Subsection 1(A) of this Executive Order, shall apply 
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statewide and to all matters, except to the extent that the suspension of deadlines in legal 
proceeding may hereafter be shortened or lifted, in whole or in part, by an order issued by 
the Louisiana Supreme Court acting in accordance with the power vested pursuant to 
Article V of the Constitution.”161   
On September 27, 2005, the Supreme Court issued an order stating that it was 
closed through October 25, 2005.162 On October 3, 2005, the Louisiana Supreme Court, 
now temporarily functioning at the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals building in 
Baton Rouge, issued a resolution of its own.  The Supreme Court’s resolution recited and 
acknowledged the various proclamations and orders issued by Governor Blanco, and then 
announced a “temporary procedure…to facilitate the shortening or lifting of the 
suspension of legal deadlines in appropriate cases.”  A trial or appellate court was 
authorized to “lift or shorten the suspension periods” if a joint motion was filed in the 
proceedings certifying that “no attorney or party to the proceeding was adversely 
impacted by Hurricanes Rita or Katrina.”  Even if there was an impacted attorney or 
party, the courts could lift deadlines in the event that the parties wished to proceed and 
filed an affidavit to that effect.  If unanimous consent to proceed could not be obtained, 
but one party desired to proceed with proceedings, the Supreme Court procedure set forth 
a mechanism for issuing rule to show cause orders and setting hearings to determine 
whether the court should proceed.  The resolution did contain an additional provision 
which stated that, “No Order lifting or shortening the suspension of legal deadlines shall 
serve to lift the suspension of liberative prescriptive periods or preemptive periods.”  
Thus, the presumption is that the deadlines that could be shortened were intended to be 
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administrative deadlines not substantive deadlines for asserting claims.  The Supreme 
Court’s resolution also specified that its provision were to be effective until October 25, 
2005, but that if the Governor extended her own executive orders the Supreme Court’s 
resolution would likewise be extended.163  Such an extension occurred on October 19, 
2005, when the Governor issued Executive Order KBB 2005-67, which extended the 
prior two orders until November 25, 2005.  Consequently, by order dated October 25, 
2005, the Louisiana Supreme Court extended its own closure by declaring that it “shall be 
closed through November 25, 2005.”164 
By mid-September the courts, which were well into the process of finding 
temporary accommodations from which to carry on limited functions, issued their own 
orders declaring “legal holidays” of varying lengths.  The effect of a legal holiday is 
effectively to extend filing deadlines. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court declared 
that it was closed from August 29, 2005 through November 25, 2005 for regular fling 
purposes, the court did continue to operate out of the First Circuit Building in Baton 
Rouge, accepting emergency filings, handling administrative matters, and assisting lower 
courts in resuming their operations.  Oral arguments resumed before the Court in a 
limited number of cases during the week of November 28-30, 2005 in Baton Rouge. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court Clerk of Court’s office in New Orleans re-opened the 
following Monday, December 1, 2005.165 
The state courts of appeal issued similar closure orders following Hurricane’s 
Katrina and Rita. The Fourth Circuit issued an order on October 27, 2005, declaring 
August 25 through November 25 to be a legal holiday; but, noted that the Clerk of Court 
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would accept filings on October 26, 2005 at its temporary location in Hammond, 
Louisiana at Southeastern Louisiana University or at an additional temporary location—
the Toulouse Room on the Second Floor of the Omni Royal Orleans Hotel in New 
Orleans.   
The Fifth Circuit issued a similar order declaring a legal holiday.  Following 
Hurricane Rita, The Third Circuit, which had been posting announcements from the 
Supreme Court, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits on its website, issued its own order closing 
form September 23, 2005 through October 14, 2005 and declaring that period a legal 
holiday.   
The various district courts affected by the storms issued similar orders: 24th JDC- 
Jefferson Parish closed through October 11, 2005 but receiving filings on emergency 
basis in the interim166; 33rd JDC- Allen Parish closed September 25, 2005 through 
October 2, 2005167; 34th Judicial District Court- St. Bernard Parish- closure August 29th 
through October 1, 2005; 15th Judicial District Court- Vermilion Parish and Acadia- 
closure September 26-28, 2005168; 14th Judicial District Court- Calcasieu Parish-  closed 
September 23-October 10, 2005169.   
The Civil District Court for Orleans Parish initially relocated to Baton Rouge and 
accepted filings there until it secured additional office space in Gonzales.  Once in 
Gonzales, the Orleans Civil District Court cancelled all jury trials due to an inability to 
empanel a jury from Orleans Parish and suspended most operations until October 25th.170   
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The effect of these orders and resolutions was an attempt by two of the three 
branches of government to protect the legal rights of those who could not access the 
courts due to either court closure or their own circumstances of hardship.   
One may argue that all of this was not necessary under existing precedent which 
recognizes that filing deadlines may be suspended when the courts are not accessible.171 
In this regard, the courts have long adopted a legal principle known by the Latin phrase 
contra non valentem agree non currit prescriptio (roughly translated, prescription does 
not run against a person unable to act) to protect the rights of individuals when access to 
the courts is not possible.  Indeed one of the first known cases in Louisiana applying this 
doctrine was the matter of  Quierry’s Executor v. Faussier’s Executors,  4 Mart. (O.S.) 
609 (La. 1817).  In that case, the plaintiff missed a filing date because the courts in New 
Orleans were inaccessible due to “the invasion” i.e. the attempted British invasion of 
New Orleans and the Battle of New Orleans at the conclusion of the War of 1812.  The 
Supreme Court concluded that the “occlusion” of the judicial system deprived the 
plaintiff of access to the courts and that the plaintiff should therefore have been granted 
additional time to file his claim.  However even in this situation, the Legislature had met 
on December 16, 1814 and “passed a law for suspension of all civil suits, and prohibiting 
the commencement of any, of one hundred and twenty days…”172  When the period of 
suspension expired, another two months passed before the suit was filed.  However, the 
plaintiff argued that in effect he only had nine months to file suit when he should have 
had twelve.  The Supreme Court allowed the filing and pursuit of the claim. 
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Irrespective of the executive orders and the orders issued by the various courts, a 
constitutional impediment concerned many practitioners and judges following Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita.  Article 3, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides 
that “only the legislature may suspend a law, and then only by the same vote and, except 
for gubernatorial veto and time limitations for introduction, according to the same 
procedures and formalities required for enactment of that law.”173  This wording in the 
1974 Constitution is different from the wording of prior constitutional provisions on the 
same subject.  From the Constitution of 1812 through the Constitution of 1921 the phrase 
“or by its authority” was also included in the referenced provision.  Arguably, this simple 
clause, included in the state Constitutions before 1974, would allow the Legislature to 
delegate the authority to suspend laws to the other branches of government including the 
governor. The Homeland Security Act and the powers vested in the governor by La. R.S. 
29:724(A) could arguably be considered such a delegation. The 1974 Constitution, 
however, omitted this important clause and one might argue that under the present 
Constitution the Legislature and only the Legislature may suspend laws- including laws 
relating to the running of prescription.  Article 2 Section 2 of the 1974 Constitution lends 
further concern.  After describing the three branches of government, the provision states 
that “except as otherwise provided by this constitution, no one of these branches…shall 
exercise power belonging to either of the others.”  Hence, if the authority to suspend 
laws, including laws providing for such things as prescription, are vested in the 
Legislature and only in the Legislature arguably neither the Executive nor Judicial 
Branch may intervene.    
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In mid-October 2005, Governor Blanco called for a special session of the 
Louisiana Legislature to meet on November 6-22, 2005.  Although the primary purpose 
of this legislative special session was to address the growing financial crisis that the state 
was facing as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, other issues including bills aimed at 
protecting the rights of individuals during the time of emergency were introduced.  Act 6 
of the Special Session specifically addressed issues associated with protecting the legal 
rights of individuals during the emergency that followed the two hurricanes.174  In this 
Act, the Legislature ratified and confirmed the actions of Governor Blanco in issuing the 
three executive orders discussed above and then provided for an additional “limited 
suspension” of prescription through January 3, 2006. With respect to liberative 
prescription and prescription of non-use the Legislature clarified that if a prescriptive or 
preemptive period ended during the period of August 26, 2005 through January 3, 2006, 
the rights would be preserved. Prescription of non-use with respect to minerals was 
expressly excluded from the suspension provision. With respect to deadlines in legal 
proceedings that were suspended by the executive orders, a limited suspension was also 
provided through January 3, 2006, if the deadline would have otherwise lapsed during the 
time of November 25th through January 3, 2006.  If a deadline was not suspended by the 
executive orders and if that deadline would have lapsed during the period of October 25, 
2005 through November 25, 2005, a party could obtain relief if a party or his attorney 
could show that they were affected by the Hurricanes and that the filings could not have 
taken place earlier.  The Legislature further recognized that the courts in Cameron, 
Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, Jefferson and Vermilion parishes as well as the legal 
communities and citizens of these parishes were so severely devastated that although the 
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courts may be open on a limited basis, the destruction in the area continued to endanger 
and infringe upon normal functioning of the judicial system.  With respect to parties in 
litigation or contemplating litigation in these areas, the Legislature provided that parties 
and counsel could apply for an additional extension of prescription, preemption and legal 
deadlines through May 31, 2006 upon showing that but for the events of the hurricanes 
the legal filing sought to be filed would have been filed.   
Act 6 further provided that the suspensions provided would not apply to landlord-
tenant disputes, eviction proceedings, and lease disputes regarding immovable property, 
provided the proceedings were carried out in accordance with the provisions of Executive 
Order KBB 2005-67. 
Seemingly, the Legislature put to rest any concerns with respect to the accrual of 
prescription during the time of emergency following the storms.  However, there were 
still instances in which the legal effect of the Governors’ executive orders was 
challenged.  Courts that have considered the applicability of the Governor’s post-Katrina 
and post-Rita executive orders and the legislature’s ratification of those orders have 
upheld their applicability under appropriate circumstances.175  
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E. Hurricane Katrina and Rita’s Impact on Attorneys 
In addition to finding homes for the courts and the challenge of preserving legal 
rights, unique challenges also faced attorneys and their law firms in the days immediately 
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Thousands of attorneys in the New Orleans area 
were part of the massive evacuation of New Orleans. Their offices were suddenly 
inaccessible. Clients could not contact attorneys and attorneys could not contact clients.  
Even if contact was made, important files and client papers were in New Orleans offices 
and inaccessible.  
In a memorandum, which was obviously typed before new “official” stationary 
could be printed, the Supreme Court directed all Louisiana judges to be patient with 
attorneys and lend assistance if necessary.  The memo stated: “Many lawyers and court 
staff have lost their clothes, files, contact with clients and witnesses, and vehicles.  Even 
when they have transportation, congestion in newly overcrowded cities leads to long 
delays.  The Court asks that you temporarily waive the dress code normally required in 
your court and exercise patience with those who appear excusably late for court.  In 
addition, please give compassionate consideration to requests for continuances in those 
cases where lawyers have lost contact with clients, witnesses, or staff or have files that 
have been destroyed or are unavailable.”176 
Many of the larger law firms, with offices in multiple locations, retreated to their 
satellite offices. Others quickly secured additional office space in Baton Rouge and 
Lafayette causing virtual real estate boom overnight.  The internet and email played 
perhaps the most vital role in attorneys locating one another and in clients locating 
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attorneys.  The Louisiana Bar Association, as well as the courts, established attorney 
relocation registers on their respective websites.   Word of various attorney locations was 
also spread among their colleagues via email.  Eventually formal correspondence was 
sent out identifying attorney locations.   Copies of files were frequently obtained from the 
courts’ electronic imaging facilities, from the courts themselves and from co-counsel who 
for the most part showed remarkable professionalism and cooperation during the times of 
crisis.  Many displaced attorneys subsequently returned to their offices in the New 
Orleans area; however many law firms that had thriving practices on the afternoon of 
August 26, 2005 no longer exist.  Like other commercial businesses, they became 
collateral damage to Katrina’s fury.   
F. Post Katrina and Rita Litigation 
Irrespective of the inability of many state courts to conduct jury trials immediately 
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the post-Katrina legal environment can only be 
classified as tepid.  Perhaps the only thing growing as fast as mold in soaked carpeting in 
New Orleans was the docket of post-Katrina lawsuits in many courts.  
According to Judge Vance, Loretta Whyte, Clerk of Court for the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana estimated that 4,753 suits related to 
Hurricane Katrina were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana in 2006.177  The total civil number of civil cases filed in the Eastern District of 
Louisiana further increased from 4774 suits in 2005 to 9805 in 2006.178  The number of 
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civil cases in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana further 
climbed steadily in 2007 to 10,484 before beginning to decline to 8,325 filings in 2008.179  
Although it is unclear exactly how many of the 2007 and 2008 filings are directly related 
to Hurricane Katrina and Rita, one explanation for the increased number of filings may 
be the expiration of limitations periods during 2006 and early 2007 as well as denial of 
certification or “opt outs” in a number of Hurricane Katrina related class action 
proceedings.  
Unfortunately, additional cases by case analysis would have to be performed to 
determine whether there is a similar pattern of Katrina and Rita specific filings in the 
state district courts. However limited data is available from the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s annual reports in 2004-2008 regarding the courts’ general case loads.  That data 
reveals that in 2005 there was a 19.6% decrease in the number of filings in the Louisiana 
Supreme Court and a 13.7% decrease in the number of filings in the Courts of Appeal.  
Total filings in the trial courts, however, were about the same as they were in 2004. The 
Supreme Court’s 2005 annual report attributes the 2005 decrease in total filings in the 
Louisiana Supreme Court and the states intermediate appellate courts as being related to 
the hurricanes; however, this conclusion really cannot be drawn from the raw numbers.180  
Comparison of other figures from 2004-2008 shows some inconsistencies. There 
is an inconsistent pattern of increases and decreases in total filings at the Louisiana 
Supreme Court during this period of time.  Filings from 2004 to 2005 decreased 19.6% 
and then from 2005-2006 increased 14.7%.  In 2007 there were 2,497 total filings in the 
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Louisiana Supreme Court which was, according to court officials, the lowest number of 
total filings in the previous twenty years.181  In 2008, the total filings in the Louisiana 
Supreme court increased to 3,014.  This number however is still below the 3,228 total 
filings in 2004.182 
At the appellate level there was a decrease in total filings in 2005 and 2006 and 
slightly increased filings in 2007 and 2008.  The total number of appellate opinions from 
the intermediate appellate courts decreased 11.2% from 2004 to 2005, increased 5.8% in 
2006, decreased 5.7% in 2007 and decreased 3.9% in 2008. 
Total filings in the district courts suffered only a negligible .03% decrease from 
2004 to 2005 and then increased in every year thereafter from 2006 to 2008. 
When one examines filings in trial courts that experienced significant adverse 
effects from Hurricane Katrina and Rita such as Orleans Civil District Court, the 34th 
Judicial District Court in St. Bernard Parish and the 38th Judicial District Court in 
Cameron, there is a sharp decrease in the number of civil filings in 2005; however, there 
is a subsequent increase in 2006 and 2007.   
One statistic, which may be attributable to the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita is the number of jury trials that were held in 2005-2008.  In 2004 there were 
seventy-one jury trials in Orleans Parish Civil District Court in 2004.  In 2005 and 2006 
there were forty-one jury trials held each year.  Only thirty-eight jury trials were held in 
2007 and only thirty-two were held in 2008.  In St. Bernard Parish, there were ten jury 
trials held in 2004 and only four in 2005.  In 2006 there were none.  Three jury trials 
were held in St. Bernard in 2007 and four in 2008.  Cameron Parish’s jury trial statistics 
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do not present a significant basis for comparison as Cameron Parish is one of the least 
populated parishes in the state and there were only two jury trials in 2004 before 
Hurricane Katrina. 
The filing data, which was acquired from the Louisiana Supreme Court’s Annual 
Reports for 2004-2008 may be summarized in the following tables: 
Table 1. Filings and Opinions in Louisiana State 
District and Appellate Courts by Year 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total Louisiana 
Supreme Court 
Filings 
3,228 2,595 3,042 2,497 3,014 
Total Court of 
Appeals Filings 
9,498 8,199 7,981 8,039 8,193 
Total Civil 
Opinions by 
Courts of Appeal 
1,931 1,685 1,822 1,674 1,546 
Total District 
Court Filings 
741,180 740,873 733,271 740,790 772,632 
 
Table 2. Civil Filings and Jury Trials in Orleans, St. Bernard  
and Cameron Parishes by Year 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Orleans CDC      
Civil Filings 18,763 13,821 14,174 16,106 12,977 
Jury Trials 71 41 41 38 32 
      
St. Bernard      
Civil Filings 2,708 2,218 2,511 2,768 1,901 
Jury Trials 10 4 0 3 4 
      
Cameron       
Civil Filings 400 383 611 261 242 
Jury Trials 2 2 2 1 4 
 
The data in the foregoing tables is raw data, as it would require a case by case 
examination to determine what percentage of total filings and total civil filings in the 
Louisiana state courts related directly to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  Also, based on the 
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raw data, there does not appear to be a significant increase in the number of filings in 
district courts statewide in the years immediately after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  In 
fact the number of district court filings was lower than the number of pre-storm filings, 
only reaching increased numbers in 2008, three years after the storms. There may be a 
number of factors that explain decreases in state court filings during the period from 
2005-2007 and the subsequent increase in 2008.  A number of individuals may have been 
participants in class actions that were pending in federal courts and therefore did not file 
individual claims in state courts.  The decreases in 2005-2007 may also be attributable to 
inaccessibility of the courts or a refocusing on other priorities.  The increase in 2008 may 
be due to increased filings due to de-certification of federal class actions or expiration of 
limitations periods.  The raw data is not clear with respect to the reasons for the increases 
and decreases.  Additional investigation into the exact nature of the suits would be 
required to draw better conclusions that the filings and number of opinions released by 
the courts was related to the hurricanes. 
Because of requirements at the time of filing, it can, however be determined that a 
number of suits that were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Louisiana clearly focused on various issues related to Hurricane Katrina.  These issues 
included the breaches of the levees in New Orleans,183 spills and leaks of various 
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substances from industrial facilities on both the east and west banks of the Mississippi 
River,184 insurance coverage issues,185 voting rights issues,186 claims associated with 
damage to Louisiana’s wetlands,187 wrongful death claims,188 claims against FEMA,189 
claims against FEMA trailer manufacturers claiming exposure to toxic formaldehyde 
fumes,190 civil rights and constitutional rights claims191 and claims that local public 
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official’s malfeasance alleged to have caused or enhanced property damage in the New 
Orleans region.192 There was even a $100 billion dollar suit that was filed in the United 
States Court of Claims in Washington, claiming that the refusal of the United States to 
improve the New Orleans levees to a state that will prevent destruction during a Category 
5 hurricane constituted an inverse condemnation.193 
In light of the significant number of filings, some courts faced numerous 
challenges in attempting to resolve their cases. For example one challenge for the courts 
was combating claims of actual or apparent bias. The judges of the courts trying the cases 
were themselves victims of the Hurricanes. Likewise, “fair and impartial” juries had to be 
comprised from citizens who themselves had been impacted by the hurricanes.  
In one case in federal court involving claims relating to the Mississippi River Gulf 
Outlet (“MRGO”) and other canal breaches, lawyers representing defendants, including 
the federal government, moved to disqualify Judge Stanwood Duval from hearing the 
case on the grounds that the judge lived in the New Orleans area and had also been 
impacted by the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.  Judge Duval denied the motion for 
disqualification.  The Fifth Circuit refused to overturn the decision.194  Due to the nature 
and scope of the destruction from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, it may be anticipated that 
similar motions to disqualify judges and jurors will be made in future cases.  Courts will 
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have to be prepared to handle these motions and honestly assess whether the defendants 
may receive fair trials under the circumstances. 
The courts also have been called on to evaluate legal relationships between 
multiple parties and sort out complex issues of causation of varying types of damage. 
Courts should anticipate and be prepared to undertake challenges such as determining 
whether insurance coverage exists and whether damage is classified as flood, wind or 
rising water for purposes of insurance coverage. Additionally courts should be prepared 
to determine whether defenses such as “Act of God” are applicable in the context of not 
only civil proceedings but also in the context of various other statutes such as the Oil 
Pollution Act and other environmental statutes.195  In addition, legal issues concerning 
whether the consequences of certain actions were foreseeable will certainly be litigated in 
the courts.   
Another significant challenge facing the courts following the hurricanes was 
adopting ways to manage the large number of cases that were filed.  There are various 
mechanisms for consolidation of large numbers of cases and claims; however, many of 
these procedural mechanisms, such as class action suits, multi-district litigation and intra-
district consolidation, have substantive limitations. Also, there are divergent views on 
whether centralized or decentralized litigation following mass disasters serves the best 
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interests of society due to perceived differences in the quality of decisions that are 
rendered.196 
Two cases that were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana present interesting examples of how that court managed a large 
number of claims in an efficient manner. One case used a traditional litigation method, 
the class action, to resolve thousands of claims arising out of a spill of crude oil from 
Murphy Oil’s refinery during Hurricane Katrina.  The other case involves the use of a 
non-traditional method of case management, intra-district consolidation for limited 
purposes to manage thousands of claims related to various aspects of Hurricane Katrina’s 
aftermath. 
The matter of Patrick Joseph Turner, et al. vs. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc. et al, No. 
05-4206, United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, was the first of 
several class action cases filed within days of Hurricane Katrina.  The case involved 
claims of negligence in connection with a large oil spill that originated from Murphy 
Oil’s refinery in St. Bernard Parish.  The oil escaped from storage tanks during Hurricane 
Katrina and was spread by the storm surge throughout residential areas in the vicinity of 
the refinery. There were multiple suits filed as a result of the spill. The Turner case was 
the first filed case having been filed on September 9, 2005.  
By November 8, 2005, upon return to the federal courthouse in New Orleans, 
Judge Eldon Fallon began holding monthly status conferences with litigants to manage all 
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cases involving the Murphy Oil spill.  Multiple cases were consolidated with the Turner 
case since it was the first filed action. The plaintiffs moved for a class certification 
hearing.  This hearing was set for January 12, 2006, a mere five months following 
Hurricane Katrina.  In this five month period, the litigants gathered scientific evidence 
concerning the scope of the oil spill and its detrimental effects. Beginning on January 12, 
2006, expert testimony was received by the court at a class certification hearing.  On 
January 30, 2006, Judge Fallon issued an order certifying a class based on the evidence 
presented by experts at the class certification hearing.  Once the class was certified, a 
notice program was instituted and a trial plan was developed for trying the merits of 
individual claims.  However, before the first trial of claims took place, a settlement, in 
excess of $200 million, was reached.  By January 30, 2007, Judge Fallon granted final 
approval for the settlement.   
The quick resolution of the claims involving the Murphy Oil spill has allowed 
many residents in St. Bernard Parish to gain certainty with respect to their future plans.  
Those who wish were impacted by the oil spills and wished to rebuild had a source of 
money to accomplish their goals. There was a “buy out” program as part of the settlement 
thereby allowing those who did not want to rebuild to sell their houses a determined “per 
square foot” price.197 
The Murphy Oil cases are an example of how a court can utilize available 
procedural mechanisms to quickly resolve a large number of claims. Unfortunately, the 
class action procedure utilized in the Murphy Oil litigation is not a “silver bullet” for 
resolving all claims. There are substantive and procedural limitations to the use of the 
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class action procedural mechanism in both state and federal courts.  Specifically, pursuant 
to both state and federal procedural rules there are requirements of “numerosity,” 
“commonality,” and “typicality” for class certification.198 These requirements cannot 
always be met in all cases, since individual factual and legal issues may predominate in 
many cases. In these cases, courts have been forced to either use alternative procedural 
mechanisms or develop creative ways of handling large numbers of claims. 
One such approach, voluntary intra-district consolidation with bell weather trials, 
was utilized by Judge Stanwood Duval in the matter of Colleen Berthelot et al. vs. Boh 
Brothers, et al., No. 05-4182, United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana.  
In the Berthelot case, which was also subsequently styled In re Katrina Canal Breaches 
Litigation, consolidation occurred through an assignment process that was agreed to by 
all of the active judges of United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana.  The cases consolidated consisted of both individual cases as well as class 
actions asserting claims based on multiple aspects of the post-Katrina aftermath.  In 
March 2006, Judge Duval grouped consolidated cases according to the levee that was 
alleged to have failed (17th Street Canal, London Avenue Canal and Industrial Canal)199 
Claims alleging damage that arose from the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (“MRGO”) 
were subsequently consolidated with one another for pre-trial purposes.200 Later, the 
court consolidated all canal breach cases irrespective of the particular canal levee that 
was breached.201  As additional suits were filed more diverse issues arose, including 
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issues pertaining to insurance coverage, governmental liabilities and immunities, 
dredging and maintenance of canals.  Consequently, on October 2, 2006, Judge Duval 
further classified the cases within five sub-categories: 1) Levee cases, 2) Insurance Cases, 
3) MRGO cases, 4) first responder cases, and 5) dredging cases.202  Additional sub-
categories for the St. Rita Nursing home cases, barge cases and the Road Home Program 
cases were added in September and October, 2006.203  Once the cases were consolidated 
and organized in this fashion, the court could proceed with addressing various legal and 
factual issues in an orderly fashion.204  However, though the court has used an intra-
district consolidation, it is likely that it will take several years for all issues arising in the 
consolidated cases to be resolved.  Time will tell whether the intra-district consolidation 
utilized by the Eastern District in the In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation has 
resulted in an efficient handling of the different types of claims arising from Hurricane 
Katrina. 
G. Lessons Learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita further focused courts, as well as attorneys, on 
preparations for disasters.  The lessons learned by other courts following September 11th 
had already begun to be discussed and implemented by courts throughout the United 
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States.  Some courts, like the federal courts, were better prepared than the state courts 
when Hurricane Katrina struck.  However, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita certainly caused 
the courts in Louisiana to take decisive steps to prepare for future disasters.  Courts in 
other states, including those in Texas have also recognized the lessons of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita and have taken steps to improve their disaster preparations. 
 Attorneys are also more focused on disaster planning.  One author has argued that 
disaster planning is a component of an attorney’s ethical obligations to properly manage 
the affairs of his clients.205 Others have begun to write and teach about the importance of 
continuity of operations plans for law firms.206   
Law firms throughout Louisiana have improved existing disaster and continuity of 
operations plans or implemented such plans in the event that they did not have them 
before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example, the law firm of Kean, Miller, 
Hawthorne, D’Armond, McCowan & Jarman, L.L.P. has improved its disaster recovery 
plan. The improvements include pre-existing contracts for ancillary facilities from which 
attorneys from the firm’s New Orleans office may work in Baton Rouge in the event of 
another large scale evacuation.  Also, a plan is in place to back up servers at remote 
locations and access computer information in the event of an emergency.  There is also a 
communications system in place with multiple redundancies whereby employees of Kean 
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Miller can obtain information concerning firm operations in the event of an 
emergency.207  Other firms in vulnerable areas have followed suit and have similar plans. 
 Following Hurricane Katrina, it became evident that the judicial branch in 
Louisiana needed to improve its disaster planning.  According to Judge Madeleine 
Landrieu, Judge of the Orleans Parish Civil District Court, she discussed the need for the 
state court system to be better prepared for disasters with Chief Justice Calagero of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court. Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the task of preparing 
disaster planning and recovery plan guidance for the district courts was assigned to the 
Louisiana District Judges Association, a non-profit organization composed of over 200 
district judges.208   
 On October 28, 2005, at the first meeting of the Louisiana District Judges 
Association following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Judge Fredricka Wicker of the 24th 
Judicial District Court and President of the District Judges Association appointed a 
committee to study and implement a disaster preparation planning for the district courts.  
Judge Landrieu was appointed chairperson of the new Disaster Recovery Planning 
Standing Committee of the Louisiana District Judges Association.  The Disaster 
Recovery Planning Committee soon thereafter began the work of developing a model 
continuity of operations plan for Louisiana’s district courts.   
The Disaster Recovery Planning Committee recognized that while all courts share 
similar core functions, differences do exist among the individual courts and a single plan 
would not be adequate to address the needs of the various district courts. Therefore, the 
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Disaster Recovery Planning Committee developed a “templet” for a model continuity of 
operations plan rather than a single uniform plan.209   
In addition to developing a templet for a continuity of operations plan for the 
district courts, the Disaster Recovery Planning Committee worked with the District 
Judges Association’s web site committee to develop a web site that would be accessible 
by district judges throughout the state to obtain information concerning disaster planning. 
The web site can also be used for internal communication among judges during times of 
emergency.210 
From October 2005 until May 2006, the District Judges Association worked 
diligently to develop the model templet for district court continuity of operations plans.  
By May 2006, in advance of the 2006 hurricane season, the templet was finished and 
distributed to the district courts.  The templet includes sections that contain forms and 
suggestions for developing chain of command and communication plans to be utilized 
during times of emergency.  Also included are templets of orders, such as closure orders, 
to be used during times of emergencies.  Suggestions are also made for completing risk 
assessments, defining mission critical systems, developing critical resources inventories 
and making plans for obtaining required resources during times of emergency. Disaster 
recovery worksheets and various checklists are also included in the templet. 
According to Judge Landrieu, some, but not all, of the district courts have now 
developed their own continuity of operations plans.211  The Civil District Court in New 
Orleans now has such a plan.  According to Judge Landrieu, a copy of the plan is kept in 
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a brief bag in her chambers and in the event of an emergency she is able to pick up the 
brief bag and take it with her.  Other judges have made similar arrangements.212 
Disaster preparation and planning has also been refined at the Louisiana Supreme 
Court.  According to the Hon. John Olivier, the Supreme Court’s continuity of operations 
plan is now in place to facilitate functioning during emergencies.213  In addition, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court has improved its technology systems and implemented changes 
to better manage future disasters.  Computer information is now backed up on remote 
servers and computer equipment has been pre-positioned in Baton Rouge for use during 
emergencies.  The court is also working on a “virtual court” computer platform that will 
allow its members to conduct business from remote locations during times of 
emergencies.214 
Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita courts still are issuing closure orders in the 
event of emergencies in order to protect rights. Closure orders similar to the orders issued 
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were entered by a number of courts, including the 
Louisiana Supreme Court when the Louisiana coast was struck by Hurricanes Gustav and 
Ike in 2008.215 
Other states have also learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  Texas is one 
example.  By order dated November 20, 2007, the Texas Supreme Court created the Task 
Force to Ensure Judicial Readiness in Times of Emergency.216  The charge given to the 
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task force was to design and implement an emergency program to prevent or manage 
disruptions to court operations throughout the State of Texas during times of emergency.  
The scope of emergencies for which the task force was to plan included hurricanes, 
pandemics, acts of violence and cyber threats.  Following formation of the task force, 
several committees were formed including committees to address the following: 1) 
border issues, 2) coordination with other branches of government, 3) legislation and 
judicial procedures and 4) technology.  The Texas Task Force to Ensure Judicial 
Readiness in Times of Emergency met regularly throughout the remainder of 2007 and 
the beginning of 2008 and subsequently produced an interim continuity of operations 
plan for the Texas courts.217  The Texas Task Force to Ensure Judicial Readiness in 
Times of Emergency has also developed additional guidance information for courts 
which is posted on the Texas Supreme Court’s website.218  Other courts continue to work 
on emergency continuity of operations plans. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Although Louisiana’s judicial system was impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita in 2005, the Louisiana courts have recovered from the aftermath of the storms. The 
federal courts in Louisiana were better prepared before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and 
having learned lessons from the September 11th attack and other disasters such as the 
Oklahoma City bombings.  The federal judiciary was encouraged to develop emergency 
plans well in advance of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  These plans were in place at the 
time Hurricane Katrina struck Louisiana.  Having already gone through the planning 
process, even though the existing plans had to be altered due to the circumstances 
presented following Hurricane Katrina, the federal courts were able to quickly resume 
operations following the storms. 
The state courts in Louisiana had not reached the level of planning that their sister 
federal courts had reached, although judicial planning for emergencies was certainly a 
work in progress, at least at the Supreme Court level, prior to Hurricane’s Katrina and 
Rita. Communications and displacement from their home bases of operation for 
prolonged periods of time presented the most significant challenges to the state courts 
following the hurricanes.  After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita the state courts at all levels 
appear to have advanced their respective disaster planning and appear to be better 
prepared to handle adverse impacts from disasters in the future.   
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
  Despite the recovery of the Louisiana Judicial System following Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita, there is still room for improvement to better prepare for future disasters.   
Unlike the federal courts which have implemented mandatory electronic case 
filing, the state courts have yet to follow suit. Courts in vulnerable areas should consider 
implementing electronic filing and record management so that records can be protected in 
the future.  This task will largely fall on the Clerk of Courts of Louisiana, separate elected 
officials.  The Clerk of Court’s offices have their own budgets though and may have 
different priorities.   
Like the courts, attorneys have started to improve their disaster preparations. 
Further research is warranted to determine the scope of these preparations.  Attorneys in 
Louisiana are subject to mandatory continuing legal education requirements under rules 
imposed by the Louisiana Supreme Court.219 Since attorneys are a vital component of the 
judicial system as a whole, the Louisiana Supreme Court should consider requiring 
periodic courses addressing disaster planning for attorneys and law firms as a part of its 
mandatory continuing education requirements. 
Although the Louisiana Legislature has enacted statutes authorizing district courts 
to conduct criminal proceedings and allowing clerks of court to conduct operations 
outside their respective jurisdictions during times of emergency, the Legislature should 
consider enacting legislation to clarify that courts in affected areas may also conduct civil 
proceedings outside their respective parishes during times of emergency. 
There are still questions concerning the scope of disaster planning by individual 
courts in Louisiana.  Further research is warranted to determine whether all Louisiana 
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courts have now developed continuity of operations plans and whether the courts 
periodically review and update these plans and if so how often.  
Additionally, further research is warranted to determine how many cases 
specifically addressing legal issues associated with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have 
been filed with the district and appellate courts in Louisiana and how efficiently the 
courts are resolving these cases. 
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF CONGRESIONAL HEARINGS ON HURRICANE KATRINA 
September 14, 2005: Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Hearing on “Recovering 
from Katrina: The Next Phase”. 
 
September 15, 2005: House Government Reform Committee, Hearing on 
“Back to the Drawing Board: A First Look at 
Lessons Learned from Katrina”. 
 
September 20, 2005: Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
Committee, Disaster Prevention and Prediction 
Subcommittee, Hearing on “The Lifesaving Role of 
Accurate Hurricane Prediction”. 
 
September 22, 2005: House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina, 
Hearing on “Predicting Hurricanes: What We Knew 
About Katrina.” 
 
September 27, 2005: House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina, 
hearing on “Katrina: The Role of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency”. 
 
September 29, 2005: House Energy and Commerce Committee, 
Environment and Hazardous Materials 
Subcommittee, Hearing on “Hurricane Katrina: 
Assessing the Current Environmental Status.” 
 
October 6, 2005: Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs, Hearing on “Hurricane 
Katrina: How is FEMA performing its mission at 
this stage of recovery?” 
 
October 7, 2005: House Science Committee, Hearing on NOAA 
Hurricane Forecasting. 
 
October 18, 2005: House Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee, Subcommittee on Economic 
Development, Public Buildings and Emergency 
Management, and on Water Resources and 
Environment, Joint Hearing on “A Vision and 
Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans”. 
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October 19, 2005: House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina, 
Hearing to review hurricane relief response, 
focusing on the role of the Homeland Security 
Department. 
 
October 20, 2005: House Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee, Subcommittee on Water Resources and 
Environment, Hearing on “Expert Views On 
Hurricane and Flood Protection and Water 
Resources Planning for a Rebuilt Gulf Coast,” Part 
I. 
 
October 27, 2005: House Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee, Subcommittee on Water Resources and 
Environment, Hearing on “Expert Views on 
Hurricane and Flood Protection and Water 
Resources Planning for a Rebuilt Gulf Coast,” Part 
II 
 
November 2, 2005: Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, 
Hearing on Hurricane Katrina Response. 
 
November 3, 2005: Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs 
Committee, Hearing on “Hurricane Katrina: Why 
Did the Levees Fail?” 
 
November 9, 2005: Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, 
Hearing on a Comprehensive and Integrated 
Approach to Meet the Water Resources Needs in 
the Wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
 
November 17, 2005: Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, 
Hearing to Evaluate the Degree to which the 
Preliminary Findings on the Failure of the Levees 
are Being Incorporated into the Restoration of 
Hurricane Protection. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
LISTING OF INDIVIDUALS TESTIFYING BEFORE 
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE HEARINGS 
INVESTIGATING HURRICANE KATRINA 
 
As of mid-November, 2005, the following individuals had testified before the 
United States Congress: 
Dan Hitchings-  Director Task Force HOPE United States Army 
Corps of Engineers 
 
Dr. Thomas F. Zimmie, PhD-  Department of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering Rensselear Polytechnic Institute and 
Member of National Science Foundation 
Investigative Team on Failure of Levees 
 
Dr. Sherwood Gagliano, PhD Coastal Environments Inc. (Baton Rouge) 
 
Larry Roth, P.E. Deputy Executive Director American Society of 
Civil Engineers 
 
Joseph Suheyda, PhD Emeritus Engineering Professor, L.S.U. 
 
Robert Verchick Professor of Loyola University Law School 
 
George Dunlop Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Civil Works) 
U.S. Army 
 
Maj. Gen. Don T. Riley Director of Civil Works, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers 
 
Anu Mittal Director, Natural Resources and Environment 
Division, U.S. General Accountability Office 
 
Windell Curole General Manager, South Lafourche Levee District 
 
Peter Brink Sr. Vice President for Programs, The National Trust 
for Historic Preservation 
 
Scott Faber Water Resources Specialist, Environmental Defense 
 
Steve Ellis Vice President, Taxpayers for Common Cause 
 
Nils Diaz Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
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Sandy Baruah Acting Asssistant Secretary of Commerce, 
Economic Development 
 
Dale Hall Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
 
David Winstead Commissioner Public Buildings Service of the 
General Service Administration 
 
Ray Nagin Mayor of New Orleans 
 
Kim Dunn Capital Deep South Center for Environmental Justice 
 
William Hines Director, Greater New Orleans, Inc. 
 
William Capka Acting Administrator Federal Highway 
Administration 
 
Lt. Gen. Carl A. Strock Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers 
 
Marcus Peacock Deputy Administrator, U.S. EPA 
 
John Paul Woodley Assistant Secretary for Civil Works, Department of 
Army 
 
David Radcliff President and CEO of Southern Company 
 
Stanley S. Litow Vice President, Corporate Community Relations, 
IBM Corporation 
 
Kevin T. Regan Regional Vice President, Starwood Hotels 
 
Jason F. Jackson Director of Business Continuity, Global Security 
Division, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
 
Max Mayfield Director Tropical Prediction Center/National 
Hurricane Center, National Weather Service, 
National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration, 
U.S. Dept. of Commerce 
 
Marc L. Levitan Director of L.S.U. Hurricane Center 
 
Carl P. Siess, Jr. Associate Professor of Civil Engineering, L.S.U. 
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Dr. Keith G. Blackwell Coastal Weather Research Center, University of 
South Alabama 
 
Patrick C. Roberts President of the Florida Association of Broadcasters 
 
Hon. Pete Wilson Former Governor of California 
 
Hon. Patricia Owens Former Mayor, Grand Forks, North Dakota 
 
Hon Marc Morial President and CEO of National Urban League and 
Former Mayor of New Orleans 
 
Iain Logan Operations Liason, International Federation of Red  
 
Marty Bahamonde Regional Director, External Affairs, Region One, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security 
 
Dr. Ivor van Heerden, PhD Leader, Team Louisiana, Forensic Data Gathering 
Task Force on Levee Failures in New Orleans 
 
Dr. Paul Mlaker, PhD, P.E. Senior Research Scientist, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers Research and Development Center 
 
Dr. Raymond B. Sneed, PhD Team Leader, National Science Foundation 
Investigative Team on Levee Failures in New 
Orleans 
 
Dr. Peter Nicholson, PhD Team Leader, Levee Assessment Team, American 
Society of Civil Engineers 
 
Rear Admiral Robert F. Duncan Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District, U.S. 
Coast Guard 
 
Captain Bruce C. Jones Commanding Officer Coast Guard Air Station New 
Orleans, U.S. Coast Guard 
 
Captain Frank M. Paskewich Commander, Coast Guard Sector New Orleans, 
U.S. Coast Guard 
 
Dr. Denise J. Reed Professor, Geology Department, University of New 
Orleans 
 
Dr. William Walker, PhD Executive Director, Mississippi Department of 
Marine Resources 
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Sidney Coffee Executive Assistant to Hon. Kathleen B. Blanco, 
Governor of Louisiana 
 
Hon. Kathleen B. Blanco Governor of Louisiana 
 
Benjamin Grumbles Assistant Administrator, Office of Water, U.S. EPA 
 
John Felmy Chief Economist, American Petroleum Institute 
 
Gary P. LaGrange Port of New Orleans 
 
J. Stephen Perry President and CEO New Orleans Metropolitan 
Convention and Visitors Bureau 
 
W. Paul Farmer Executive Director and CEO of American Planning 
Association 
 
Mtumishi St. Julien Executive Director, Finance Authority of New 
Orleans 
 
Wynton Marsalis Musical Artist, New Orleans Native 
 
Hon. Mitchell J. Landrieu Lieutenant Governor of Louisiana 
 
Dr. Roy K. Dokka, PhD Department of Engineering, L.S.U. 
 
Raymond Butler Executive Director, Gulf Coast Intercoastal Canal 
Association 
 
Erik D. Olson Sr. Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council 
Mayor Bill Rutledge National Rural Water Association 
 
Mayor Eddie Favre National Rural Water Association 
 
Dr. Stephen E. Ragone, PhD Director of Science and Technology, National 
Ground Water Association 
 
Hon. Karen K. Gautreaux Deputy Secretary, Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality 
 
Dr. Henry Falk, M.D., M.P.H. Director, Coordinating Center for Environmental 
Health and Injury Prevention, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention/Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry, U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services 
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Michael Voisin Chairman, Louisiana Oyster Task Force, Owner of 
Motivatit Seafood, Inc. 
 
Jerome Ringo  Chairman of Board of National Wildlife Federation 
107 
VITA 
 Charles McCowan III is a resident of Baton Rouge, Louisiana.  Charles earned his 
Bachelor of Science degree in political science in 1986 from Louisiana State University 
and his Juris Doctorate, cum laude, from Tulane University School of Law in 1989.  
Charles is a practicing attorney and has been a member of the Louisiana State Bar 
Association and American Bar Association since 1989.  Charles is licensed to practice 
law before all Louisiana State Courts as well as the United States Supreme Court, the 
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana, the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Louisiana and the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.   
Charles is a partner in the law firm of Kean, Miller, Hawthorne, D’Armond, 
McCowan & Jarman, L.L.P. where he has maintained an active law practice in the area of 
oil and gas and environmental law since 1989. Charles is the recipient of the New 
Orleans Chapter of the Federal Bar Association’s 2009 Camille Gravel Award for pro 
bono public service. 
